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Reinflating Logical Consequence

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Abstract

Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be deflationists about truth but not logical consequence.

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Correspondence to Owen Griffiths.

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Griffiths, O. Reinflating Logical Consequence. J Philos Logic 43, 171–179 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9258-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9258-y

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