Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 33–51 | Cite as

Truth and Context Change

  • Andreas StokkeEmail author


Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems.


Truth Dynamic semantics Presuppositions Epistemic modals 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LanCogUniversity of LisbonLisbonPortugal
  2. 2.CSMNUniversity of OsloOsloNorway

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