Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 575–593 | Cite as

Naive Modus Ponens

  • Elia Zardini


The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s non-contractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which does not suffer from the same problem.


Contraction Curry’s paradox Entailment Logical consequence Modus ponens Transparent truth 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northern Institute of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, School of Divinity, History and PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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