Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

Abstract

In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.

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Correspondence to Toby Meadows.

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Meadows, T. Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost. J Philos Logic 42, 221–240 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9219-x

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Keywords

  • Truth
  • Semantic truth definition
  • Dependence
  • Supervaluation
  • Leitgeb
  • Kripke
  • Revision theory of truth