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Logic and Ontological Pluralism

Journal of Philosophical Logic volume 41, pages 419–448 (2012)Cite this article

Abstract

Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different ways or modes of being. In contemporary guise, it is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain. Although thought defeated for some time, recent defenses have shown a number of arguments against the view unsound. However, another worry looms: that despite looking like an attractive alternative, ontological pluralism is really no different than its counterpart, ontological monism. In this paper, after explaining the worry in detail, I argue that considerations dealing with the nature of the logic ontological pluralists ought to endorse, coupled with an attractive philosophical thesis about the relationship between logic and metaphysics, show this worry to be unfounded.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

    Jason Turner

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  1. Jason Turner
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Correspondence to Jason Turner.

Additional information

This paper grew out of an extended discussion with Jonathan Schaffer. So: Thanks, Jonathan! Thanks also to Robbie Williams and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions and guidance.

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Turner, J. Logic and Ontological Pluralism. J Philos Logic 41, 419–448 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9167-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9167-x

Keywords

  • Ontological pluralism
  • Free logic
  • Many-sorted logic
  • Metaphysics
  • Notational variants
  • Logical realism
  • Ontology