Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp 347–385 | Cite as

Tolerant, Classical, Strict

Open Access
Article

Abstract

In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases.

Keywords

Vagueness Sorites paradox Tolerance Logical consequence Truth Non-transitivity Trivalent logics Paraconsistent logics 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of NavarraPamplonaSpain
  2. 2.Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), Département d’Etudes Cognitives de l’ENSParisFrance
  3. 3.Department of Philosophy—Old QuadUniversity of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia
  4. 4.Institute for Logic, Language and ComputationUniversiteit van AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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