Abstract
Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at the same time.
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Douven, I. Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals. J Philos Logic 37, 259–266 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9065-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9065-z