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Remarks on Penrose’s “New Argument”

Abstract

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas–Penrose arguments and even Penrose’s ‘new argument’ in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42] and elsewhere of this question.

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References

  1. Chalmers, D. J. (1995): Minds, machines, and mathematics. A review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose, Psyche 2, (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au).

  2. Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250.

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  3. Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press.

  4. Penrose, R. (1995): Beyond the doubting of a shadow. A reply to commentaries on Shadows of the Mind, Psyche 2, (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au).

  5. Shapiro, S. (2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42.

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Correspondence to Per Lindström.

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Lindström, P. Remarks on Penrose’s “New Argument”. J Philos Logic 35, 231–237 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9014-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9014-7

Key Words

  • knowability (in mathematics)
  • Lucas–Penrose thesis