Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

Abstract

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

  1. 1.

    Thepot (2014, p. 3).

  2. 2.

    Parret (2010, p. 30).

  3. 3.

    Motta (2004, p. 30).

  4. 4.

    Aaronson (1996, p. 1).

  5. 5.

    Dabbah (2000, p. 371).

  6. 6.

    Willimsky (1997, p. 54).

  7. 7.

    Odudu (2010, p. 599).

  8. 8.

    Willimsky (1997, p. 55).

  9. 9.

    Willimsky (1997, p. 55).

  10. 10.

    Motta (2004, pp. 17–26).

  11. 11.

    Willimsky (1997, p. 57).

  12. 12.

    Parret (2010, p. 340).

  13. 13.

    Parret (2010, p. 340).

  14. 14.

    Graham (2013, p. 5).

  15. 15.

    Scott (2009, p. 6).

  16. 16.

    Hutchings Michael (1995, p. 212).

  17. 17.

    Rodger (2000, p. 310).

  18. 18.

    Maitland-Walker (1999, p. 51).

  19. 19.

    Pilsbury and Jenkins (2010, p. 216).

  20. 20.

    Rodger and MacCulloch (2015, p. 26).

  21. 21.

    Graham (2012, p. 555).

  22. 22.

    Graham (2012, p. 555).

  23. 23.

    Graham (2012, p. 555).

  24. 24.

    OFT and CC web archives. See also Graham (2013, p. 20).

  25. 25.

    Graham (2013, p. 20).

  26. 26.

    Graham (2012, p. 561).

  27. 27.

    Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 25(3).

  28. 28.

    Graham (2013, p. 20).

  29. 29.

    OFT (2012, p. 6).

  30. 30.

    CMA (2014, para. 5.14).

  31. 31.

    Galloway (2009, p. III-381).

  32. 32.

    Storey and Turner (2014, p. 405). See also Wils (2000, p. 100).

  33. 33.

    Wils (2000, p. 100).

  34. 34.

    Case C-41/90.

  35. 35.

    Case C-41/90 [21].

  36. 36.

    Case 170/83.

  37. 37.

    Case 170/83 [11].

  38. 38.

    Case 170/83 [10]–[11].

  39. 39.

    Case 19/61.

  40. 40.

    Case 19/61 [371].

  41. 41.

    Thepot (2014, p. 3).

  42. 42.

    Thepot (2014, p. 77).

  43. 43.

    Thepot (2014, p. 3).

  44. 44.

    Arguably the behavioural remedy is just as important, and often used, sanction in the competition authority toolkit as the fine.

  45. 45.

    Parret (2010, p. 365).

  46. 46.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para. 6.5).

  47. 47.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para. 6.5).

  48. 48.

    Hüschelrath (2014, p. 10).

  49. 49.

    Hüschelrath (2014, pp. 9–10).

  50. 50.

    Competition Act 1998, s 36. Imprisonment, directors’ disqualification, and individual fines are also public enforcement mechanisms but there is a number of issues with them which are far broader issues with which the article cannot deal. These mechanisms are also implemented after imposing regulatory sanctions on companies.

  51. 51.

    OFT (2010, para. 1.10).

  52. 52.

    Wils (2006, p. 183).

  53. 53.

    Frazer (1995, p. 853).

  54. 54.

    Ginsburg and Wright (2010, pp. 11 and 16).

  55. 55.

    Stephan (2011, p. 535).

  56. 56.

    Stephan (2011, p. 529).

  57. 57.

    Coffee (1980, p. 389).

  58. 58.

    Khan (2012, p. 78).

  59. 59.

    OFT (2010).

  60. 60.

    Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 22).

  61. 61.

    Except the individual sanctions.

  62. 62.

    Rock (1992, p. 498).

  63. 63.

    Thepot (2014, pp. 14–15).

  64. 64.

    Thepot (2014, p. 17).

  65. 65.

    Stephan (2010, pp. 236–239). See also Thepot (2015b, p. 4).

  66. 66.

    Stephan (2010, p. 239).

  67. 67.

    Weitbrecht (2008, p. 88).

  68. 68.

    Schwarcz (2015, p. 554).

  69. 69.

    Gürkaynak et al. (2015, p. 145).

  70. 70.

    Thepot (2015a, p. 1).

  71. 71.

    Oded (2010, pp. 22–23).

  72. 72.

    Oded (2010, p. 22).

  73. 73.

    OFT (2010). See also OFT (2011a, b, c).

  74. 74.

    CMA (2016).

  75. 75.

    OFT (2010, para. 1.5). See also OFT (2011a, b, c, para 1.2).

  76. 76.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para 1.2).

  77. 77.

    CMA (2016).

  78. 78.

    CMA (2016).

  79. 79.

    The company, which has established strong compliance programme, would be granted up to 10% reduction in fines.

  80. 80.

    Wils (2013, p. 63).

  81. 81.

    McKendall et al. (2002, p. 367). See also Krawiec (2003, pp. 510–515).

  82. 82.

    Krawiec (2005, p. 596).

  83. 83.

    Krawiec (2003, pp. 514–515).

  84. 84.

    Kitson (1996, p 1021).

  85. 85.

    Brief et al. (1996, p. 183).

  86. 86.

    Schwartz (2001, p. 253).

  87. 87.

    McKenzie (2008, p. 12).

  88. 88.

    It can be understandable that if the company is punished for non-existence of compliance programme as it would be considered as its ignorance of law.

  89. 89.

    Arlen and Kraakman (1997, p. 693).

  90. 90.

    Krawiec (2003, p. 541).

  91. 91.

    Krawiec (2005, p. 591).

  92. 92.

    Krawiec (2005, p. 591).

  93. 93.

    Tyran and Feld (2006, p. 153).

  94. 94.

    Thepot (2015b, p. 2).

  95. 95.

    Krawiec (2005, p. 591).

  96. 96.

    Oded (2010, p. 23).

  97. 97.

    Thepot (2015b, pp. 2–3). See also OFT (2012, para. 2.15).

  98. 98.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para 1.6).

  99. 99.

    No. CA98/9/2002.

  100. 100.

    No. CA98/9/2002 [66].

  101. 101.

    Singleton (2008, p. 102).

  102. 102.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para. 1.2).

  103. 103.

    No. CA98/2/2003.

  104. 104.

    No. CA98/2/2003 [404].

  105. 105.

    No. CA98/2/2003 [404].

  106. 106.

    No. CA98/2/2003 [405].

  107. 107.

    Hasbro analysed above can be an example of such situation as it illustrates the difference between the motivation of the company and its senior management employees.

  108. 108.

    Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 18).

  109. 109.

    Onwudiwe et al. (2005, p. 234).

  110. 110.

    Onwudiwe et al. (2005, pp. 234–235).

  111. 111.

    Reiss (1984, p. 94).

  112. 112.

    Scholz (1997, p. 254).

  113. 113.

    Scholz (1997, p. 254).

  114. 114.

    Arlen (1994, p. 835).

  115. 115.

    Onwudiwe et al. (2005, p. 235).

  116. 116.

    Scholz (1997, p. 261).

  117. 117.

    Such as criminal law, consumer law, and environmental law. See Rodger and MacCulloch (2015, p. 218).

  118. 118.

    Rodger and MacCulloch (2015, p. 218).

  119. 119.

    OFT (2012, para. 1.4).

  120. 120.

    Rodger and MacCulloch (2015, pp. 221–222).

  121. 121.

    OFT (2012, para 2.1).

  122. 122.

    Hawkins (1983, p. 36).

  123. 123.

    Oded (2010, p. 3).

  124. 124.

    Braithwaite and Ayres (1992, p. 25). See also Braithwaite (1985, p. 182).

  125. 125.

    Oded (2010, p. 1).

  126. 126.

    See generally Scholz (1984a, b).

  127. 127.

    Oded (2010, p. 23).

  128. 128.

    Scholz (1984a, b, p. 393).

  129. 129.

    Braithwaite and Ayres (1992).

  130. 130.

    Braithwaite (1985, p. 142). See also Braithwaite (1985) and Braithwaite and Ayres (1992, 35).

  131. 131.

    Braithwaite and Ayres (1992, p. 35).

  132. 132.

    Braithwaite (2002, pp. 29–43).

  133. 133.

    International Chamber of Commerce (2011, p. 31).

  134. 134.

    OFT (2011a, b, c, para 1.10 and 4.18).

  135. 135.

    Rodger (2009, p. 65).

  136. 136.

    Chisholm (2014).

  137. 137.

    Krawiec (2005, p. 615).

  138. 138.

    Individuals are additionally punished through individual sanctions.

  139. 139.

    Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 16).

  140. 140.

    Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 16).

  141. 141.

    Such effort provides only 10% fine reduction to the company.

  142. 142.

    Gray (1996, pp. 299–300).

  143. 143.

    Calkins (1997, p. 147).

  144. 144.

    Whelan (2007, p. 27).

  145. 145.

    Clarkson (1996, p. 563).

  146. 146.

    Clarkson (1996, p. 563).

  147. 147.

    Clarkson (1996, p. 563).

  148. 148.

    The UK provides 10% fine reduction for functioning strong compliance programme, but such allowance does not diminish the company’s liability significantly as it is still held liable for the infringement.

  149. 149.

    See CMA (2017).

  150. 150.

    See CMA (2018).

References

Journal Article

  1. Arlen, J. 1994. The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability. Journal of Legal Studies 23: 833.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Arlen, J., and R. Kraakman. 1997. Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes. New York University Law Review 72(4): 687.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Brief, A.P., J.M. Dukerich, P.R. Brown, and J.F. Brett. 1996. What’s wrong with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics 15: 183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Calkins, S. 1997. Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties. Law and Contemporary Problems 160: 27.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Clarkson, C. 1996. Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls. Modern Law Review 59(4): 557.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Coffee, J.C. 1980. No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment. Michigan Law Review 79: 386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Dabbah Maher, M. 2000. Measuring the Success of a System of Competition Law: A Preliminary View. European Competition Law Review 21(8): 369.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Frazer, T. 1995. Monopoly, Prohibition and Deterrence. Modern Law Review 58(6): 846.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Ginsburg, D., and J. Wright. 2010. Antitrust Sanctions. Competition Policy International 6(2): 3.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Graham, C. 2012. The Reform of UK Competition Policy. European Competition Journal 8: 539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Gray, J. 1996. Company Directors and Ignorance of the Law. Company Lawyer 17(10): 296.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Gürkaynak, G., Ç.O. Kama, and B. Ergün. 2015. How to Establish and Operate an Anti-Corruption Compliance Program in Emerging Markets: The Turkish Example. Turkish Commercial Law Review 1(2): 145.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Hawkins, K. 1983. Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of Regulation. Law and Policy Quarterly 5(1): 35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Hutchings Michael, B. 1995. The Need for Reform of UK Competition Policy. European Competition Law Review 16(4): 211.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Khan, A. 2012. Rethinking Sanctions for Breaching EU Competition Law: Is Director Disqualification the Answer? World Competition 35: 77.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Kitson, A. 1996. Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank. Journal of Business Ethics 15: 1021.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Krawiec, K.D. 2003. Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance. Washington University Law Quarterly 81: 487.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Krawiec, K.D. 2005. Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model. Florida State University Law Review 32: 571.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Maitland-Walker, J. 1999. The New U.K. Competition Law Regime. European Competition Law Review 20(2): 51.

    Google Scholar 

  20. McKendall, M., B. DeMarr, and C. Jones-Rikkers. 2002. Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines. Journal of Business Ethics 37: 367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Odudu, O. 2010. The Wider Concerns of Competition Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(3): 599.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Parret, L. 2010. Shouldn’t We Know What We Are Protecting? Yes We Should! A Plea for a Solid and Comprehensive Debate about the Objectives of EU Competition Law and Policy. European Competition Journal 6(2): 339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Pilsbury, S., and H. Jenkins. 2010. The Evolution of Effects-Based Analysis under the Competition Act 1998. Company Lawyer 9: 216.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Reiss, A.J. 1984. Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion. Law and Contemporary Problems 47(4): 83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Rock, E.B. 1992. Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens. Columbia Law Review 92: 497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Rodger, B.J. 2000. Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective. Columbia Journal of European Law 6(3): 289.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Rodger, B.J. 2009. A Study of Compliance Post-OFT Infringement Action. European Competition Journal 65: 95.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Scholz, J.T. 1984a. Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement. Law and Society Review 18: 179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Scholz, J.T. 1984b. Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement. Law & Policy 6(4): 385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Scholz, J.T. 1997. Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory. Law and Contemporary Problems 60(3): 253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Schwarcz, S.L. 2015. Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame. Emory Law Journal 65: 533.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Schwartz, M. 2001. The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour. Journal of Business Ethics 32: 247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Stephan, A. 2010. No Evil: Cartels and the Limits of Antitrust Compliance Programs. Company Lawyer 31(8): 231.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Stephan, A. 2011. Disqualification Orders for Directors Involved in Cartels. Journal of European Competition Law 2(6): 529.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Thepot, F. 2015a. Antitrust v. Anti-Corruption Policy Approaches to Compliance: Why Such a Gap? CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2: 1.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Tyran, J.-R., and L.P. Feld. 2006. Achieving Compliance When Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108(1): 135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Weitbrecht, A. 2008. From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond—The First 50 Years of European Competition Law. European Competition Law Review 29(2): 81.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Whelan, P. 2007. A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishment under EC Cartel Law. Competition Law Review 4(1): 7.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Willimsky Sonya, M. 1997. The Concept(s) of Competition. European Competition Law Review 18(1): 54.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Wils, W.P.J. 2000. The Undertaking as Subject of E.C. Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons. European Law Review 25(2): 99.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Wils, W.P.J. 2006. Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice. World Competition 29(2): 183.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Wils, W.P.J. 2013. Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1(1): 52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Online Article

  1. McKenzie, B. 2008. Legal Risk and Compliance: Special Report. http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/cfd093ec-a4d7-4009-9d6c-46dfafafd935/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7020eac4-e025-4ca6-8fb3-484e82407e5f/london_rmc_importance_rms_survey_2008.pdf. Accessed 25 Dec 2018.

  2. Oded, S. 2010. Enforcement Strategies, Compliance Programs, and The Intermediary Gatekeepers. https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=ALEA2010&paper_id=197. Accessed 10 Oct 2018.

  3. Scott, A. 2009. The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom. LSE Working Papers. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807. Accessed 12 Oct 2018.

  4. Thepot, F. 2015b. Corporate Compliance with Competition Law. Ascola Annual Conference, Meiji University. http://ascola-tokyo-conference-2015.meiji.jp/pdf/Workshop%20Contributions/Florence%20Thepot_CORPORATE%20COMPLIANCE%20WITH%20COMPETITION%20LAW.pdf. Accessed 18 Nov 2018.

Book

  1. Aaronson, R., Borrie, G., Cave, M., Pitt-Watson, D. 1996. The Future of UK Competition Policy. London: Commission on Public Policy & British Business.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Braithwaite, J. 1985. To Punish or Persuade—Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Braithwaite, J. 2002. Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Braithwaite, J., and I. Ayres. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Graham, C. 2013. EU and UK Competition Law. London: Pearson.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Motta, M. 2004. Competition Policy—Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Rodger, B.J., and A. MacCulloch. 2015. Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK. Oxford: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Singleton, S. 2008. Competition Law Compliance 2008—A Special Briefing. London: Thorogood.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Storey, T., and C. Turner. 2014. Unlocking EU Law. Oxford: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

Book Chapter

  1. Galloway, J. 2009. Chapter 2A: Competition Disqualification Orders’ in His Honour Judge Abbas Mithani (ed) Mithani: Directors’ Disqualification. Butterworths: London.

  2. Hüschelrath, K. 2014. Public Enforcement of Anti-Cartel Laws—Theory and Empirical Evidence’. In Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe Legal and Economic Perspectives, ed. Kai Hüschelrath and Heike Schweitzer. Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Onwudiwe, I., J. Odo, and E.C. Onyeozili. 2005. Deterrence Theory. In Encyclopedia of Prisons & Correctional Facilities, ed. Mary Bosworth. Beverly Hills: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

Online Document

  1. Chisholm, A. 2014. Achieving a Culture if Compliance. Law Society Competition Section Annual Conference London. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/achieving-a-culture-of-compliance. Accessed 12 July 2018.

  2. CMA. 2014. Consumer Protection: Guidance on The CMA’s Approach to Use of Its Consumer Powers. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288624/CMA7_Consumer_Protection_guidance.pdf. Accessed 13 December 2018.

  3. CMA. 2016. Motivating Businesses to Comply with Competition Law. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/icn/j_frame.pdf. Accessed 22 Nov 2018.

  4. CMA. 2017. Help Us Stop Unfair Cartels. https://stopcartels.campaign.gov.uk/. Accessed 17 Dec 2018.

  5. CMA. 2018. CMA Sends Tough Message to Business Cheats with Cartel Campaign. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-sends-tough-message-to-business-cheats-with-cartel-campaign. Accessed 15 Oct 2018.

  6. International Chamber of Commerce. 2011. Promoting Antitrust Compliance: The Various Approaches of National Antitrust Authorities. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/compliance/icc_comparative_study_en.pdf. Accessed 12 Aug 2018. 

  7. OFT. 2010. Drivers of Compliance and Non-Compliance with Competition Law: An OFT Report. www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft1227.pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2018.

  8. OFT. 2011a. The Impact of Competition Interventions on Compliance and Deterrence Final Report. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402165036/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1391.pdf. Accessed 5 Aug 2018.

  9. OFT. 2011b. How Your Business Can Achieve Compliance with Competition Law. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284402/oft1341.pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2018.

  10. OFT. 2011c. Company Directors and Competition Law. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284410/oft1340.pdf. Accessed 12 Sept 2018.

  11. OFT. 2012. OFT’s Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284393/oft423.pdf. Accessed 3 Sept 2018.

  12. OFT and CC. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140525130048, http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/;jsessionid=9EEEE525FE054F2C06E2DE92082E562D and http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141250, http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/about-us. Accessed 20 Sept 2018.

Dissertation

  1. Thepot, F. 2014. The Interaction between Competition Law and Corporate Governance: Opening the ‘Black Box’. Ph.D. thesis. University College London.

Cases

  1. Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, [1993] 4 CMLR 306.

  2. Case 170/83 Hydrotherm v Compact [1985] ECR 3016.

  3. Case 19/61 Mannesmann v High Authority [1962] ECR 357.

  4. Decision of the Directors General of Fair Trading, No. CA98/9/2002.

  5. Decision of Director General of Fair Trading No. CA98/2/2003.

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Samet Caliskan.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Caliskan, S. Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors. Liverpool Law Rev 40, 1–29 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-019-09220-4

Download citation

Keywords

  • Company
  • Directors
  • Regulatory infringements
  • Compliance
  • Deterrence
  • Public enforcement