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Realism and Analysis Within Public Law

Abstract

Allan, Loughlin and Walker represent leading theorists within the realm of public law analysis. Accordingly, when such theorists write on a similar topic, such as that of the theory of constitutionalism, it can be assumed that their analysis and evaluation of the theory represents a ‘realistic’ account. However, close examination of their writings does not reveal similarity but instead much divergence, even incompatibility. This then raises the question, how can such diversity represent reality? If all three theorists are examining the same phenomenon then surely there must be some similarity between their accounts for there to be reality? Alternatively, if all the perceptions of the theorists are indeed real, then perhaps it is the way that public lawyers represent reality that needs to be examined.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Generally see Allan (1993), (1998), (2000), (2001), (2002), (2003), (2004), (2006).

  2. 2.

    Generally see Loughlin (2000), (2003a, b), (2005), (2008), (2009), (2010a, b).

  3. 3.

    Generally see Walker (2002), (2003a, b), (2008a, b), (2010a, b).

  4. 4.

    Loughlin (2008) 64.

  5. 5.

    Loughlin (2005) 186.

  6. 6.

    Walker (2002) 354.

  7. 7.

    Walker (2002) 357.

  8. 8.

    Tribe (1989).

  9. 9.

    Hayes (1991–92).

  10. 10.

    Ruhl (2008).

  11. 11.

    Coyle and Pavlakos (2005).

  12. 12.

    Although Scandinavian legal realism emerged at the same time as that of American legal realism its influence was limited. The works of its key writers are rarely referenced or applied today even within Scandinavia.

  13. 13.

    Langdale (1871) quoted in Twining (1985) 11. See also Dickinson (1929) 141–146.

  14. 14.

    Pound (1908).

  15. 15.

    Kaplan (1985) 10.

  16. 16.

    Llewellyn (1930a, b).

  17. 17.

    Purcell (1973).

  18. 18.

    Dworkin (1986).

  19. 19.

    Posner (1995) 19.

  20. 20.

    Hale (1923) and Cohen (1927).

  21. 21.

    Leiter (1997–98) 272–273.

  22. 22.

    ibid.

  23. 23.

    Leiter (1997–98) 273.

  24. 24.

    Hart (1961).

  25. 25.

    Hart (1961) 141–147.

  26. 26.

    Murphy and Coleman (1989) 33–36.

  27. 27.

    Leiter (1996), (1997–98).

    Leiter (1996) 264.

  28. 28.

    Leiter (1996) 263, (2007).

  29. 29.

    Kornblith (1994).

  30. 30.

    Putnam (1981) and Hale and Wright (1997) 427–457.

  31. 31.

    Giere (1999) 22–26.

  32. 32.

    Giere (1999) 18–21.

  33. 33.

    Dummett (1978).

  34. 34.

    Giere (2006).

  35. 35.

    Giere (1999) 26.

  36. 36.

    ibid.

  37. 37.

    Leiter (2007) 60.

  38. 38.

    Giere (2006) 17–18.

  39. 39.

    Giere (2006) 18.

  40. 40.

    Giere (2006) 32.

  41. 41.

    ibid.

  42. 42.

    ibid.

  43. 43.

    ibid.

  44. 44.

    Niinilouto (1999) 5.

  45. 45.

    Loughlin (2009) 6.

  46. 46.

    Loughlin (2009) 8.

  47. 47.

    Loughlin (2003a) 160, precept 26.

  48. 48.

    Loughlin (2010b) 2.

  49. 49.

    Loughlin (2003a) Chapter 9 specifically outlines the precepts of the pure theory, though the book as a whole provides the necessary foundation for understanding the theory.

  50. 50.

    Loughlin (2003a) 153.

  51. 51.

    Loughlin (2003a) 132.

  52. 52.

    Loughlin (2003a) 30.

  53. 53.

    Walker (2003a) 4.

  54. 54.

    Most recently outlined in Walker (2010b) Chapter 14.

  55. 55.

    Walker (2003b).

  56. 56.

    Allan (2001) 3.

  57. 57.

    Allan (2001) 14.

  58. 58.

    Allan (2004) 689.

  59. 59.

    Allan (2004) 690.

  60. 60.

    ibid.

  61. 61.

    Constitutional issues have a ‘pedigree’ of scholarly study amongst historians as evidenced by the works of W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development (1874-8); E.A. Freeman, The Growth of the English constitution form the earliest times (1876); T.B. Maccauly, History of England (1876) and H. Hallam, Constitutional History of England (1848). These works are generally viewed as representing a ‘whig interpretation of history’ where there is an inevitable progression towards liberty culminating in democracy and a constitutional monarchy (See H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, 1931). It is only in the late 19th century that law professors with a specific interest in constitutional issues emerged, most notably, A.V. Dicey. Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) established constitutional issues as a legitimate area of interest to lawyers and not a subject exclusive to historians. In contrast, contract and trusts, have always represented legitimate areas of interest to lawyers. The struggle here, and one relevant to others areas of law, was the establishment of academic credibility and legitimacy. Generally see Sugarman (1986).

  62. 62.

    Alexander (1998).

  63. 63.

    For example Weiler and Wind (2003) and Dobner and Loughlin (2010).

  64. 64.

    Loughlin (2010a) 61 and 64–66.

  65. 65.

    Walker (2010a) 223–224.

  66. 66.

    Llewellyn (1930a) 438–43, 447–53.

  67. 67.

    Walker (2002) 317.

  68. 68.

    Walker (2010b) 296.

  69. 69.

    Walker (2003b) 32.

  70. 70.

    Walker (2003b) 45–52.

  71. 71.

    Walker (2010a).

  72. 72.

    The whole of the Foundations of Public Law (2010b) is an explication of droit politique as the basis of public law.

  73. 73.

    Most succinctly encapsulated in Loughlin (2009) and expanded upon more broadly in Loughlin (2010b) particularly chapters 7, 8 and 9.

  74. 74.

    Loughlin (2003a).

  75. 75.

    Loughlin (2010b) 2.

  76. 76.

    Walker (2003b) 41–42.

  77. 77.

    Loughlin (2010b) 8–9.

  78. 78.

    Allan, (2002) 104.

  79. 79.

    See this continuing in Walker (2010a) and Loughlin (2010a).

  80. 80.

    Giere (2006) 33.

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Mauthe, B., Webb, T.E. Realism and Analysis Within Public Law. Liverpool Law Rev 34, 27–46 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-013-9128-x

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Keywords

  • Realism
  • Constitutionalism
  • Public law