Allan, Loughlin and Walker represent leading theorists within the realm of public law analysis. Accordingly, when such theorists write on a similar topic, such as that of the theory of constitutionalism, it can be assumed that their analysis and evaluation of the theory represents a ‘realistic’ account. However, close examination of their writings does not reveal similarity but instead much divergence, even incompatibility. This then raises the question, how can such diversity represent reality? If all three theorists are examining the same phenomenon then surely there must be some similarity between their accounts for there to be reality? Alternatively, if all the perceptions of the theorists are indeed real, then perhaps it is the way that public lawyers represent reality that needs to be examined.
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Mauthe, B., Webb, T.E. Realism and Analysis Within Public Law. Liverpool Law Rev 34, 27–46 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-013-9128-x
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