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Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals
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  • Published: 15 June 2018

Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals

A study of truth conditionality and minimal change

  • Ivano Ciardelli  ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-6152-34011 nAff3,
  • Linmin Zhang  ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7864-125X2 nAff4 &
  • Lucas Champollion  ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4544-51132 

Linguistics and Philosophy volume 41, pages 577–621 (2018)Cite this article

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Abstract

Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.

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Author notes

  1. Ivano Ciardelli

    Present address: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Ludwigstraße 31, 80539, Munich, Germany

  2. Linmin Zhang

    Present address: NYU-ECNU Institute of Brain and Cognitive Science, New York University Shanghai, 1555 Century Avenue, Room 1262, Shanghai, 200122, China

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 107, 1098XG, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Ivano Ciardelli

  2. Department of Linguistics, New York University, 10 Washington Place, New York, NY, 10003, USA

    Linmin Zhang & Lucas Champollion

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  1. Ivano Ciardelli
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Correspondence to Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang or Lucas Champollion.

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Ciardelli, I., Zhang, L. & Champollion, L. Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals. Linguist and Philos 41, 577–621 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4

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  • Published: 15 June 2018

  • Issue Date: December 2018

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4

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Keywords

  • Counterfactuals
  • Experimental semantics
  • Crowdsourcing survey
  • Disjunctive antecedents
  • Inquisitive semantics
  • Minimal change semantics
  • Ordering semantics
  • Causal reasoning
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