Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality

Abstract

In this paper we discuss a phenomenon we call perspectival plurality, which has gone largely unnoticed in the current debate between relativism and contextualism about predicates of personal taste (PPTs). According to perspectival plurality, the truth value of a sentence containing more than one PPT may depend on more than one perspective (subjects, experiencers or judges). Prima facie, the phenomenon engenders a problem for relativism and can be shaped into an argument in favor of contextualism. We explore the consequences of perspectival plurality in depth and assess several possible responses on behalf of advocates of relativism.

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Correspondence to Dan Zeman.

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Kneer, M., Vicente, A. & Zeman, D. Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality. Linguist and Philos 40, 37–60 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-016-9198-z

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Keywords

  • Predicates of personal taste
  • Relativism
  • Contextualism
  • Perpsectival plurality