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Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss a phenomenon we call perspectival plurality, which has gone largely unnoticed in the current debate between relativism and contextualism about predicates of personal taste (PPTs). According to perspectival plurality, the truth value of a sentence containing more than one PPT may depend on more than one perspective (subjects, experiencers or judges). Prima facie, the phenomenon engenders a problem for relativism and can be shaped into an argument in favor of contextualism. We explore the consequences of perspectival plurality in depth and assess several possible responses on behalf of advocates of relativism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, 4200 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA

    Markus Kneer

  2. Department of Linguistics and Basque Studies, University of the Basque Country, 5 Unibertsitateko Ibilibdea, 2nd Floor, Office No. 2.21, 01006, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain

    Agustin Vicente

  3. Department of Linguistics and Basque Studies, University of the Basque Country, 5 Unibertsitateko Ibilibdea, 1st Floor, Office No. 1.53, 01006, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain

    Dan Zeman

  4. IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Maria Diaz de Haro 3, 6th floor, 48013, Bilbao, Spain

    Agustin Vicente

Authors
  1. Markus Kneer
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  2. Agustin Vicente
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  3. Dan Zeman
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Correspondence to Dan Zeman.

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Kneer, M., Vicente, A. & Zeman, D. Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality. Linguist and Philos 40, 37–60 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-016-9198-z

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