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Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 37–60 | Cite as

Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality

  • Markus Kneer
  • Agustin Vicente
  • Dan ZemanEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

In this paper we discuss a phenomenon we call perspectival plurality, which has gone largely unnoticed in the current debate between relativism and contextualism about predicates of personal taste (PPTs). According to perspectival plurality, the truth value of a sentence containing more than one PPT may depend on more than one perspective (subjects, experiencers or judges). Prima facie, the phenomenon engenders a problem for relativism and can be shaped into an argument in favor of contextualism. We explore the consequences of perspectival plurality in depth and assess several possible responses on behalf of advocates of relativism.

Keywords

Predicates of personal taste Relativism Contextualism Perpsectival plurality 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.Department of Linguistics and Basque StudiesUniversity of the Basque CountryVitoria-GasteizSpain
  3. 3.Department of Linguistics and Basque StudiesUniversity of the Basque CountryVitoria-GasteizSpain
  4. 4.IKERBASQUEBasque Foundation for ScienceBilbaoSpain

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