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Law and Philosophy

, Volume 37, Issue 6, pp 671–695 | Cite as

Vesting Agent-Relative Permissions in a Proxy*

  • Saba Bazargan-ForwardEmail author
Article
  • 66 Downloads

Abstract

We all have agent-relative permissions to give extra weight to our own well-being. If you and two strangers are drowning, and you can save either yourself or two strangers, you have an agent-relative permission to save yourself. But is it possible for you to ‘vest’ your agent-relative permissions in a third party – a ‘proxy’ – who can enact your agent-centered permissions on your behalf, thereby permitting her to do what would otherwise be impermissible? Some might think that the answer is ‘no’; it is definitive of agent-centered permissions that they apply only to the individuals ineliminably referenced in the content of that reason, which means that they lack reason-giving force for any ostensible proxy. The purpose of this paper is to (i) show that vesting agent-relative permissions is indeed possible, (ii) provide an account of how agent-relative permissions are vested by considering the structure of rights more generally, and (iii) show that we have a right to vest such permission in this way.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUC San DiegoLa JollaUSA

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