Abstract
In his rich and stimulating book, Blake argues (among other things) that comprehensive coercion triggers egalitarian obligations of distributive justice. I argue that (1) coercion is not a necessary condition for egalitarian justice to apply; (2) Blake’s use of a moralised conception of coercion is a mistake; (3) coercion is a redundant member of any set of sufficient conditions that might explain why distributive justice applies; (4) Blake’s emphasis on providing conditions for the exercise of autonomy might support a much more cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice.
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Sangiovanni, A. Is Coercion a Ground of Distributive Justice?. Law and Philos 35, 271–290 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-015-9253-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-015-9253-x