Law and Philosophy

, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp 3–31

Retributivism In Extremis


DOI: 10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2

Cite this article as:
Husak, D. Law and Philos (2013) 32: 3. doi:10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2


I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples of self-defense he subsequently tries to apply to ordinary cases of punishment.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

Personalised recommendations