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Legal Statements and Normative Language

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Abstract

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one.

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Correspondence to Luís Duarte d’Almeida.

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Duarte d’Almeida, L. Legal Statements and Normative Language. Law and Philos 30, 167–199 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9089-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9089-3

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