Abstract
Entitlement theorists claim that bequest is a moral right. The aim of this essay is to determine whether entitlement theorists can, on their own grounds, consistently defend that claim. I argue that even if there is a moral right to self-appropriated property and to engage in inter vivos transfers, it is a mistake to contend that there exists an equivalent moral right to make a bequest. Taxing or regulating bequest does not violate an individual’s moral rights because, regardless of whether bequest safeguards certain interests, those interests are not the interests of a living, morally inviolable being. Instead, they are the interests of a deceased entity that has lost the ability to track what it values and pursue projects in accord with those values – a quality that by entitlement theorists’ own arguments renders persons morally significant and deserving of rights in the first place.
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I would like to thank Loren Lomasky and John Simmons for their helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants of the University of Virginia’s Ethical and Political Thought Workshop along with an anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy for their useful suggestions.
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Braun, S.S. Historical Entitlement and the Practice of Bequest: Is There a Moral Right of Bequest?. Law and Philos 29, 695–715 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9082-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9082-x