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Patrolling the borders of consequentialist justifications: the scope of agent-relative restrictions

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Correspondence to Michael S. Moore.

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Walgreen University Chair, Professor of Law, Professor of Philosophy, Professor in the Center for Advanced Studies, and Co-Director of the Program in Law and Philosophy, University of Illinois. This paper was originally given at the Rutgers Center for Law and Philosophy, Camden, NJ (June, 2004); it was specifically written to be given as the 2005 Natural Law Lecture, Fordham University, New York City (November, 2005); it was then given at the Faculty Workshop, Loyola University School of Law, Chicago (December, 2005); then at a Faculty Workshop, Michigan State University School of Law (February, 2006); and then at the Conference on Causation and Responsibility, Mt. Hood, Oregon (November, 2006). My thanks go to the participants of each of these presentations for their helpful comments.

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Moore, M.S. Patrolling the borders of consequentialist justifications: the scope of agent-relative restrictions. Law and Philos 27, 35–96 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-007-9011-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-007-9011-9

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