Abstract
The governance phenomenon brings law back to its very ‘origin’, namely, law-making (‘Recht-Fertigung’), and reveals that law is not anchored to a specific ‘polis’ or to Hobbesian statehood, but is able to pursue different forms of ‘the common’ as long as its paradox function is fulfilled. Law recognises and develops normative standards for the creation of social structures while also leading a continuous battle against any restrictions to democracy, common wealth and justice connected to these structures. Law here acts ‘politically’ and in affinity to social movements that struggle against any form of social ‘immunisation’. This article analyses the conditions of this affinity and its consequences for the concept of ‘justice’.
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Notes
See N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 1993).
See G. Deleuze, Was ist Philosophie? (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 1996).
See, for example, L. Zagato, “Governance: a challenge for international law?”, in M. Blecher, G. Bronzini, J. Hendry and C. Joerges, eds., “Governance, Civil Society and Social Movements”, European Journal of Legal Studies 3 (2008) (forthcoming).
See G. Agamben, Homo Sacer. Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 28 et seq.
See, for example, C. Joerges, “A New Alliance of De-legalisation and Legal Formalism? Reflections on Responses to the Social Deficit of the European Integration Project”, in this volume.
See J. Habermas, “Kommunikative Rationalität und grenzüberschreitende Politik: eine Republik”, in: P. Niesen, B. Herborth, eds., Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen Habermas und die internationale Politik (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 2007) 406–460 at 425.
Compare with G. Frankenberg, “National, Supranational, Global, Ambivalences of Civil Society’s Practice”, in this volume.
See, for example, G. Teubner, “Justice Under Global Capitalism?”, in this volume.
See M. Foucault, “Was ist Aufklärung?”, in: E. Erdmann, R. Forst, A. Honneth, eds., Ethos der Moderne. Foucaults Kritik der Aufklärung (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 1990).
I prefer the concept of ‘contingency’ to the one of ‘difference’ used by R. Ciccarelli in his paper “Governance and Governmentality: Same Problem, Different Answers”, in this volume. This is to underline that also the difference made by a new or different distinction is ‘always possible in a different form’ or is contingent. This avoids the attribution of any ‘hegemonic sense’ to the new distinction, which appears to be created by a process of conflict and cooperation (‘governance’). The creation of the difference or of a new (‘more just’) distinction results, then, in contingency in terms of resistance to the previous difference. It is in this way that contingency becomes self-reflexive.
See C. Joerges, supra n. 5, on a new ‘recombination’ of de-legalising and re-formalising aspects.
See M. Surdi, “Code, Constitution and Compromise, a Cyberconundrum?”, in M. Blecher, G. Bronzini, J. Hendry and C. Joerges, eds., “Governance, Civil Society and Social Movements”, European Journal of Legal Studies 3 (2008) (forthcoming).
See J. Dine, “The Capture of Corruption: Complexity and Corporate Culture”, in M. Blecher, G. Bronzini, J. Hendry and C. Joerges, eds., “Governance, Civil Society and Social Movements”, European Journal of Legal Studies 3 (2008) (forthcoming).
See G. Bronzini, “The Social Dilemma of European Integration”, in this volume, and also G. Allegri, “New Social Movements and the Deconstruction of New Governance. Fragments of Post-Modern Constitutional Theories in Europuzzle”, in M. Blecher, G. Bronzini, J. Hendry and C. Joerges, eds., “Governance, Civil Society and Social Movements”, European Journal of Legal Studies 3 (2008) (forthcoming).
I would like to emphasise here that this ‘critical’ concept of Governance (organised by law) was, by and large, anticipated by Rudolf Wiethölter’s 1982 concept of the ‘proceduralisation of law’, which means social construction by creation of adequate ‘standards, decision-making bodies and procedures’ that law has to take care of. Cf. R. Wiethölter, “Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law”, in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (de Gruyter: Berlin, New York, 1986); and “Proceduralisation of the Category of Law”, C. Joerges and S. Trubek, eds., Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate (Nomos: Baden Baden, 1989).
See Agamben, supra n. 4, at 93, and 129 et seq.
The climax of this tradition is certainly marked by T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 1966 and 1975).
M. Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalität II. Die Geburt der Biopolitik. Vorlesungen am College de France 1978–1979 (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 2004).
See J. Butler, Psyche der Macht. Das Subjekt der Unterwerfung (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 2001).
See on this model, U. Bröckling, Das unternehmerische Selbst – Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M, 2007).
See J. Derrida, Gesetzeskraft: Der mystische Grund der Autorität (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt, 1991) at 105 et seq.
See G. Teubner, “Selbstsubversive Gerechtigkeit: Kontingenz- oder Transzendenzformel des Rechts?”, manuscript on file with author (Frankfurt, July 2007).
Ibid. See also C. Menke “Selbstreflexion des Rechts: Die Figur subjektiver Rechte und die Politik: Luhmann – Derrida”, manuscript on file with author (Berlin, July 2007).
See Deleuze, supra n. 2.
See Menke, ibid., at 38.
See R. Wiethölter, “Recht-Fertigungen eines Gesellschafts-Rechts”, in C. Joerges, G. Teubner, ed., Rechtsverfassungsrecht (Nomos: Baden Baden, 2003) at 13 et seq.
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Blecher, M. Mind The Gap. Law Critique 19, 297–306 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-008-9031-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-008-9031-0