Skip to main content
Log in

Multilevel public funding for small business innovation: a review of US state SBIR match programs

  • Published:
The Journal of Technology Transfer Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

US State governments invest in early-stage innovative activity as an economic development strategy. Nevertheless, attention directed at the public sector’s role in this capacity has been placed on federal policy actions overlooking the growing role of states. The primary aims of this paper are two-fold: (1) to articulate the motivations for multilevel public support for small business innovative activity, placing emphasis on state level incentives directed towards entrepreneurial activity; and (2) to empirically evaluate the State Match Phase I (SMP-I) program. The SMP-I program is a diffuse state level policy designed to complement the federal Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program by offering noncompetitive matching funds to the state’s successful SBIR Phase I recipients. This offers an opportunity to examine the marginal impact of public R&D given the state intervention. This paper employs a state and year fixed effects model and considers two outcome variables—SBIR Phase II success rates and SBIR Phase I application activity. To account for industrial heterogeneity, the data are stratified by the federal mission agencies. Results from the empirical analysis indicate that the state match increases the Phase II success rates for firms participating in the National Science Foundation SBIR program.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.

Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Source: http://www.sbir.gov/past-awards; total derived.

  2. As Greenstone et al. (2010) highlight, these spillovers are likely to be local and include “cheaper and faster supply of intermediate goods and services, proximity to workers or consumers, better quality of worker-firm matches in thicker labor markets, lower risk of unemployment […] and knowledge spillovers” (p. 537).

  3. More commonly, private investors tend to provide financial support later in the development cycle when the economic returns are more secure (Lerner 2009).

  4. Mazzucato’s reference to the “State” refers broadly to the government, not to US state governments.

  5. Vannevar Bush wrote this report in 1945. The 1980 reprinted version published by the National Science Foundation is referenced in this article.

  6. Sources: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14300/ and http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14307/#tab1.

  7. This reference refers to a reprinted version of the Federalist Papers.

  8. The 11 federal agencies that participate in the SBIR/STTR program include: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Institutes of Standards and Technology), Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Science Foundation.

  9. As of 2011, the legislation requires federal agencies with annual extramural R&D budgets in excess of $100 million to set aside 2.5 % of their funds for the program. This has been scheduled to increase incrementally between 0.1 and 0.2 % annually until 2017.

  10. This rule remains prominent for much of the SBIR programs across the agencies. However, in 2012 three mission agencies enacted a Direct to Phase II pilot program, where Phase II applicants were not required to have a Phase I award.

  11. See Table 1 in Lanahan and Feldman (2015) for a comprehensive list of the programs by state.

  12. These services include in-kind funds for proposal preparation, workshops, one-on-one mentoring and consultation support.

  13. Noncompetitive funds are available for all successful Phase I recipients, though it is subject to availability of funds in each fiscal year.

  14. The following states are listed in order of initial program adoption: NY, HI, OK, IN, KS, NJ, KY, NC, IL, MI, NE, CT, MT and VA (Lanahan and Feldman, 2015). See Table 3 in Lanahan and Feldman (2015) for a list of adoption years.

  15. This was confirmed not only in the program solicitations, but also in conversation with a number of program officers responsible for administering the federal SBIR program.

  16. Data on the population of project level state matches is not available; specifically for certain states. Thus to assess the effect of the SMP-I program on a national scale, the author aggregated the data to the state level.

  17. As is emphasized at the annual AAAS Science and Technology Forums, this is subject to frequent fluctuations (e.g. Koizumi 2008). Federal mission agencies with annual extramural R&D budgets in excess of $100 million were required to set aside 2.5 % of their funds for the program in 2011.

  18. “The effective alignment of the program with widely varying mission objectives, needs, and modes of operation is a central challenge for an award program that involves a large number of departments and agencies. The SBIR program has been adapted effectively by the management of the individual departments, services, and agencies, albeit with significant differences in mode of operation reflecting their distinct missions and operational cultures” (Wessner 2008; p. 5).

  19. Refer to Table 3 in Lanahan and Feldman (2015) for policy years.

  20. This variable is included to effectively control for state capacity in the SBIR program. This is likely endogenous with the outcome variables, thus the author is aware that this coefficients for this term will offer insight on the association of this variable with the outcomes. This variable is included to control for endogenous variation that might bias the effect of the SMP-I variable on the two outcome measures.

  21. \( Y_{it} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} SMP I_{it} + \beta_{2} SBIR_{it} + \beta_{3} R\& D_{it} + \beta_{4} High\,Tech\,Capacity_{it} + \beta_{5} Y_{it - 1} + \varepsilon_{it} \) (Pooled OLS).

  22. The descriptive statistics for the aggregate measure of Phase II success rates reports greater within state variation (0.1392 SD) than between state variation (0.0602 SD). This trend holds when stratified by mission agency as well.

  23. The DoD has actually received criticism for this concentration of funding (Wessner 2008).

  24. The author was successful in securing project level matches for a handful of the states with the policy; however, some states were unwilling or unable to share this detailed information due to data restrictions or incomplete administrative records. Thus in the effort to offer a broad overview of the SMP-I program, the policy variable is coded as a binary indicator.

  25. TechNet and the SBA’s sbir.gov are the two central repositories for SBIR award data. TechNet was the primary SBIR data source prior to the roll out of the sbir.gov website in 2011. Several diagnostic tests were run comparing the two data sources. The sbir.gov data source is more complete than TechNet; however, TechNet matches Phase II to Phase I awards, which is one of the primary outcome measures of interest in this analysis. TechNet provides data up through 2013; however, complete data is available through 2008. While the sbir.gov data is more complete, determining the Phase II Success Rate would require matching over 19,000 Phase II awards to Phase I awards based on the string variable—Proposal Title. Given limited resources, the author relied on the TechNet database, which matches the awards; however, the data is only complete up through 2008.

  26. The program was initially authorized in 1982 mandating federal agencies with extramural budgets in excess of $100 million to set aside 0.2%. Over the first six years of the program, this increased to 1.25 %. In 1992, the program was reauthorized and the set-aside rate increased to 2.5 %. In 2000, the program was reauthorized a second time resulting in an increase in the size of the Phase I and Phase II awards. The most recent reauthorization in 2011 extended the program to 2017.

  27. Policy activity for the most recent four adoptions falls outside the timeframe of interest; complete data on the key dependent variables are only available through 2011. Moreover, the most recent reauthorization was 2011, prior to these state adoptions.

  28. This paper presents the level ratio of the SBIR location quotient in addition to the quartile rankings of the SBIR location quotient. The former is included as a baseline and is interacted with the primary policy variable of interest. The latter is included to illustrate how the state’s relatively ranking varies with respect to the leading group of states.

  29. This test holds if the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions are correct is not rejected.

  30. The policy variable is significant for the NASA stratification in the pooled OLS estimation with the set of quartile rankings of the SBIR LQ (Table 7 Column 1).

  31. Results are available upon request from the author.

  32. Results are available upon request from the author.

  33. Interestingly, this indicates that the AB model might be appropriate for this specification. The results for the AB for the models with Phase I applications were not included given the lack of theoretical motivation—as discussed in Sect. 4.1.1. Nevertheless, based off these results, there appears to be evidence that lagged application activity is positively associated with subsequent application activity. Although this is not the focus of this particular study, this warrants additional research. Attention, moreover, should be directed to SBIR mills. While research on SBIR mills are lacking, there is a general consensus that these recipients are associated with excessive Phase I award rates that never commercialize. Among the sample of firms that are classified as SBIR mills, this suggests that Phase I success breeds Phase I success rather than applying to Phase II. The author would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers from earlier revisions of this paper for pointing this out.

  34. Research has found that the nature of innovative activity varies across industry, thus it is useful to account for these differences. These differences are particularly evident when comparing software and biotech industries, for example (Graham et al. 2009).

  35. This was derived as follows based on the marginal effects reported from the coefficients on the state policy variable—SMP-I: 0.40 * 1.194 = 0.4776; 0.40 * 1.238 = 0.4952.

  36. DoE (LQ), NASA (LQ) and NSF (LQ) report the location quotient functional form of grant and contract activity for states by federal mission agency, respectively. The US average serves as the reference category. See the notes in Table 10 for more discussion.

References

  • Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490), 493–505.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. (1997). The exploration of technological diversity and geographic localization in innovation: Start-up firms in the semiconductor industry. Small Business Economics, 9(1), 21–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., & Gambardella, A. (2004). Markets for technology: The economics of innovation and corporate strategy. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Audretsch, D. B., & Feldman, M. P. (2004). Chapter 61 knowledge spillovers and the geography of innovation. In J. V. Henderson & T. Jacques-François (Eds.), Handbook of regional and Urban economics (Vol. 4, pp. 2713–2739). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Audretsch, D. B., Link, A. N., & Scott, J. T. (2002). Public/private technology partnerships: Evaluating SBIR-supported research. Research Policy, 31(1), 145–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Belenzon, S., & Schankerman, M. (2013). Spreading the Word: Geography, policy, and knowledge spillovers. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3), 884–903.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berglund, D., & Coburn, C. (1995). Partnerships: A compenduim of state and federal cooperative technology programs. Columbus: Battelle Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (1990). State lottery adoptions as policy innovations: An event history analysis. The American Political Science Review, 84(2), 395–415.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blume-Kohout, M. E., Kumar, K. B., & Sood, N. (2009). Federal Life Sciences Funding and University R&D. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 15146.

  • Bradley, S. R., Hayter, C. S., & Link, A. N. (2013). Models and methods of university technology transfer. Foundations and Trends in Entreprenuership, 9(6), 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bush, V. (1980). Science–the endless frontier: A report to the President on a program for postwar scientific research. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation. Reprinted May 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2009). Microeconometrics using stata (Vol. 5). College Station: Stata Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chatterji, A., Glaeser, E. L., & Kerr, W. R. (2013). Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation: National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 19013.

  • Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R. R., & Walsh, J. P. (2002). Links and impacts: The influence of public research on industrial R&D. Management Science, 48(1), 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Combes, R. S., & Todd, W. J. (1996). From henry grady to the georgia research alliance: A case study of science-based development in Georgia. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 798(1), 59–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cozzens, S. E., & Melkers, J. E. (1997). Use and usefulness of performance measurement in state science and technology programs. Policy Studies Journal, 25(3), 425–435.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • David, P. A., Hall, B. H., & Toole, A. A. (2000). Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private R&D? A review of the econometric evidence. Research Policy, 29(4–5), 497–529.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, A. M. (1999). Does federal funding “crowd in” private funding of science? Contemporary Economic Policy, 17(4), 423–431.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A., & Corporation, Rand. (1967). Inside bureaucracy (p. 264). Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, M. P., & Audretsch, D. B. (1999). Innovation in cities: Science-based diversity, specialization and localized competition. European Economic Review, 43(2), 409–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, M. P., & Lanahan, L. (2010). Silos of small beer: A case study of the efficacy of federal innovation programs in a key midwest regional economy. In S. Progress (Ed.), (Vol. September 23, 2010). Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

  • Feldman, M. P., & Lanahan, L. (2014). State Science Policy Experiments. In A. Jaffe & B. Jones (Eds.), The changing frontier: Rethinking science and innovation policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, M. P., Lanahan, L., & Lendel, I. (2014). Experiments in the laboratories of democracy: State scientific capacity building. Economic Development Quarterly, 28(2), 107–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feller, I. (1997). Federal and state government roles in science and technology. Economic Development Quarterly, 11(4), 283–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, K., Uyarra, E., & Laranja, M. (2011). Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for innovation. Research Policy, 40(5), 702–713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gagnon, M. A., & Lexchin, J. (2008). The cost of pushing pills: A new estimate of pharmaceutical promotion expenditures in the United States. PLoS Medicine, 5(1), e1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Georghiou, L., & Roessner, D. (2000). Evaluating technology programs: Tools and methods. Research Policy, 29(4–5), 657–678.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glaeser, E. L., & Kerr, W. R. (2009). Local industrial conditions and entrepreneurship: How much of the spatial distribution can we explain? Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18(3), 623–663.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2001). The venture capital revolution. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 145–168.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graham, S. J. H., Merges, R. P., Samuelson, P., & Sichelman, T. (2009). High technology entrepreneurship and the patent system: Results of the 2008 Berkeley patent survey. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 24(4), 1255–1327.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenstone, M., Hornbeck, R., & Moretti, E. (2010). Identifying agglomeration spillovers: Evidence from winners and losers of large plant openings. The Journal of Political Economy, 118(3), 536–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griliches, Z. (Ed.). (1998). Issues in Assessing the contribution of research and development to productivity growth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change. American Sociological Review, 49(2), 149–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, J. W. (2012). Office of science and technology: Continuation review report. Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Commerce.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hecker, D. E. (2005). Occupational employment projections to 2014. Monthly Laboratory Review, 128, 70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmes, T. J. (2010). Structural, experimentalist, and the descriptive approaches to empirical work in regional economics. Journal of Regional Science, 50(1), 5–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Howell, S. (2015) Financing constraints as barriers to innovation: Evidence from R&D grants to energy startups. Job market paper (working paper).

  • Hsu, D. H., & Ziedonis, R. H. (2013). Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for valuing entrepreneurial-firm patents. Strategic Management Journal, 34(7), 761–781.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M., & Fogarty, M. (2000). Knowledge spillovers and patent citations: Evidence from a survey of inventors. The American Economic Review, 90(2), 215–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M., & Henderson, R. (1993). Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 577–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keller, M. R., & Block, F. (2013). Explaining the transformation in the US innovation system: The impact of a small government program. Socio-Economic Review, 11(4), 629–656.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, P. (2003). A guide to econometrics. Cambridge: MIT press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koizumi, K.(2008). Historical trends in federal R&D. AAAS Report XXXIII: Research and development FY 2009. Washington DC: AAAS.

  • Lanahan, L., & Feldman, M.P. (2015). Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix: A Closter Look at State Policies that Augment the Federal SBIR Program. Manuscript tentatively accepted at Research Policy.

  • Lerner, J. (1999). The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program. Journal of Business, 72(3), 285–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lerner, J. (2009). Boulevard of broken dreams: Why public efforts to boost entrepreneurship and venture capital have failed–and what to do about it. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Link, A. N., & Scott, J. T. (2012). Employment growth from public support of innovation in small firms. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 21(7), 655–678.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Madison, J. (2002). Powers and continuing advantages of the states. In B. F. Wright (Ed.), The federalist (pp. 324–329). New York: MetroBooks.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mazzucato, M. A. (2013). The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs private sector myths. London: Anthem Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCann, P., & Ortega-Argilés, R. (2013). Smart specialization, regional growth and applications to European Union cohesion policy. Regional Studies,. doi:10.1080/00343404.2013.799769.

    Google Scholar 

  • Melkers, J. (2004). Assessing the Outcomes of state science and technology organizations. Economic Development Quarterly, 18(2), 186–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Melkers, J., & Willoughby, K. (1998). The State of the states: Performance-based budgeting requirements in 47 out of 50. Public Administration Review, 58(1), 66–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muller, A., Valikangas, L., & Merlyn, P. (2005). Metrics for innovation: Guidelines for developing a customized suite of innovation metrics. Strategy and Leadership, 33(1), 37–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Osborne, D. (1988). Laboratories of democracy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Payne, A. A. (2001). Measuring the effect of federal research funding on private donations at research universities: Is federal research funding more than a substitute for private donations? International Tax and Public Finance, 8(5), 731–751.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plosila, W. H. (2004). State science- and technology-based economic development policy: History, trends and developments, and future directions. Economic Development Quarterly, 18(2), 113–126.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Porter, M. E. (1996). Competitive advantage, agglomeration economies, and regional policy. International regional science review, 19(1–2), 85–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Porter, M. E., & Stern, S. (2001). Location matters. Sloan Management Review, 42(4), 28–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruegg, R. T., & Feller, I. (2003). A toolkit for evaluating public R & D investment : Models, methods, and findings from ATP’s first decade. US Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology.

  • Saxenian, A. L. (1996). Regional advantage: Culture and competition in silicon valley and route 128. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scotchmer, S. (2004). Innovation and incentives. Cambridge: MIT press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shadish, W. R., Campbell, D. T., & Cook, T. D. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stephan, P. (2012). How economics shapes science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Storey, D. J. (1994). Understanding the small business sector. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship.

  • Taylor, C. D. (2012). Governors as economic problem solvers a research commentary. Economic Development Quarterly, 26(3), 267–276.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tibbetts, R. (2001). The importance of small high-technology firms to economic growth… and how to nurture them through SBIR. Industry and Higher Education, 15(1), 24–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toole, A. A., & Czarnitzki, D. (2007). Biomedical academic entrepreneurship through the SBIR program. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63(4), 716–738.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wallsten, S. J. (2000). The effects of government-industry R&D programs on private R&D: The case of the Small Business Innovation Research program. The Rand Journal of Economics, 31(1), 82–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wessner, C. (2008). An Assessment of the SBIR Program. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, D. J. (2009). Beggar thy neighbor? The in-state, out-of-state, and aggregate effects of R&D tax credits. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), 431–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yu, J., & Jackson, R. (2011). Regional innovation clusters: A critical review. Growth and Change, 42(2), 111–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J. M., Voigt, P., Gutiérrez-Gracia, A., & Jiménez-Sáez, F. (2007). Regional innovation systems: How to assess performance. Regional Studies, 41(5), 661–672.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhao, B., & Ziedonis, R. (2012). State Governments as Financiers of Technology Startups: Implications for Firm Performance. Available at SSRN 2060739.

Download references

Acknowledgments

This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the UNC Graduate School. The origins of this line of work builds upon Maryann P. Feldman’s NSF Grant (0947814): State Science Policies: Modeling Their Origins, Nature, Fit, and Effects on Local Universities. The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the author. This research is part of the author’s dissertation project, The Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix: State SBIR Matching Programs. I would like to thank my advisor, Maryann Feldman, for her thoughtful comments and guidance on this research project. Additionally, I would like to thank Alexandra Graddy-Reed, Jeffrey Schroeder, Daniel Smith and four anonymous reviewers for reviewing earlier versions of this paper. Jeremy Moulton and Jade Marcus Jenkins both offered valuable feedback on the empirical analysis.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Lauren Lanahan.

Appendix: Arellano bond ex-post specification tests

Appendix: Arellano bond ex-post specification tests

Table 11 reports the results from the test of whether \( \Delta \varepsilon_{it} \) are correlated with \( \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t - k} \) for k ≥ 2. This is caluated based on the correlation of fitted residuals \( \Delta \hat{\varepsilon }_{it} \). To pass the test, we reject at order 1, but not at higher levels (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: p. 300). The results hold for the NASA estimation and are weakly supported for the NSF estimation. The results do not hold for the DoE estimation (See Table 11).

Table 11 Serial correlation

Table 12 reports the tests for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis states that the population moment conditions are correct (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: p. 301). In each case, we fail to reject that the population moment conditions are correct, and therefore pass the test (See Table 12).

Table 12 Overidentifying restrictions

Taken together, the NASA estimation passes the post-estimation tests; the NSF estimation weakly passes the post-estimation tests; and the DoE estimation does not pass the test. All results are reported; however, caution is taken when interpreting the results for the NSF and DoE AB estimations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lanahan, L. Multilevel public funding for small business innovation: a review of US state SBIR match programs. J Technol Transf 41, 220–249 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-015-9407-x

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-015-9407-x

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation