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Enumeration of All the Extreme Equilibria in Game Theory: Bimatrix and Polymatrix Games

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Abstract

Bimatrix and polymatrix games are expressed as parametric linear 0–1 programs. This leads to an algorithm for the complete enumeration of their extreme equilibria, which is the first one proposed for polymatrix games. The algorithm computational experience is reported for two and three players on randomly generated games for sizes up to 14 × 14 and 13 × 13 × 13.

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Communicated by P. M. Pardalos

The authors thank Bernhard von Stengel for constructive comments on the contents of this paper.

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Audet, C., Belhaiza, S. & Hansen, P. Enumeration of All the Extreme Equilibria in Game Theory: Bimatrix and Polymatrix Games. J Optim Theory Appl 129, 349–372 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-006-9070-3

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