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Credibility of Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-State Differential Games

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Abstract

We characterize in this paper the credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-state differential games. We derive a general condition for credibility and illustrate its use on two differential games taken from the literature of environmental economics and knowledge accumulation. We show that the proposed linear incentive strategies are not always credible. Further, we provide alternative nonlinear credible strategies which suggest that we should not stick only to linear incentive strategies, even in a simple class of differential games such as the linear-state one.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Assistant Professor, epartamento de Economía Aplicada (Matemáticas), Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain

    G. Martín-Herrán

  2. Professor, GERAD and marketing Department, HEC Montréal, Montréal, Canada

    G. Zaccour

Authors
  1. G. Martín-Herrán
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  2. G. Zaccour
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Additional information

This research was completed when the first author was visiting professor at GERAD, HEC, Montréal. The first author’s research was partially supported by MCYT under project BEC2002-02361 and by JCYL under project VA051/03, confinanced by FEDER funds. The second author’s research was supported by NSERC, Canada.

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Martín-Herrán, G., Zaccour, G. Credibility of Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-State Differential Games. J Optim Theory Appl 126, 367–389 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2

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