Abstract
Notions of human agency are a prominent part of some but not all criminological theories. For example, McCarthy (Annu Rev Sociol 28:417–442, 2002) argues that rational choice theory, which allows persons great involvement in decision making, is more congenial with notions of human agency than others. It would appear from his argument that rational choice theory offers fertile ground to develop a clearly defined role for human agency in criminal behavior. In this paper we have taken up McCarthy’s view and argue that an important part of what is human agency consists of thoughtfully reflective decision making. We outline four elements of thoughtfully reflective decision making, and claim that it is a characteristic that varies both across persons and within persons over time. It is in short the process by which good decisions are made because by using this process one increases the likelihood that choices made will be consistent with preferences. We develop a clear operational definition of thoughtfully reflective decision making and link it to the concept of human agency. We also articulate testable hypotheses about the short-term and longer-term implications of thoughtfully reflective decision making. We conclude with a discussion of what we think lies ahead for future conceptual and empirical work.
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Notes
The idea that there is an individual-level attribute that captures differences in the process through which decisions are made and life is approached is certainly not new. There is an abundant literature in philosophy, psychology, and sociology about good or competent decision making (Baron 2008; Byrnes 1998, 2002; Rescher 2003). Clausen (1991, 1993) describes planful competence as self-knowledge about one’s abilities and interests and how to take advantage of them, and the self-confidence to undertake such action. The three components of planful competence are dependability, intellectual involvement, and self-confidence. Those who are planfully competent are predicted to have more favorable long-term life outcomes such as stable work careers and more successful marriages. Langer (1989) describes mindfulness as the ability to think openly and creatively about problems and how to solve them. Its opposite, mindlessness, is characterized by rigid thinking and an inability to think out of context. Like planful competence, those possessing mindfulness are predicted to make better decisions and enjoy a wealth of better short- and long-term life outcomes. What we have called thoughtfully reflective decision making is different than both planful competence and mindfulness. Competence is based more upon one’s abilities and capacities such as intelligence, confidence, and punctuality while mindfulness refers more to the ability to think creatively or “out of the box”—the ability to see novel solutions. TRDM, though cognitive, is not determined by intelligence but is more multidimensional, including as it does a complex of abilities and traits such as emotional maturity, and motivation. Those who make thoughtfully reflective decisions, then, combine several personal competencies as well as the ability to reconcile emotions, competing situational and motivational demands that may interfere with good decision making (see Byrnes et al. 1999; Byrnes 2002).
For example, what is the answer to the following question. “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” (Kahneman 2003: 1450). An intuitive answer would be 10¢ because it is easy to think that a dollar more than that is the desired total cost of $1.00, but it would be wrong because if the bat costs $1 more than the ball then the bat must cost $1.10, and the total cost would be $1.20 while the total must be $1.10. The correct answer is 5¢ for the ball and $1.05 for the bat. Most of us might immediately say the ball costs 10¢ on the basis of quick intuition, but if asked to give careful thought to the problem before answering we would likely come up with the correct answer.
Although we argue that TRDM varies across the life course we cannot directly test this hypothesis. In the Add Health data, measures of TRDM are only now available at the first wave. In a cross-section, however, TRDM does vary monotonically with age.
For one exception see McGloin and Shermer (2009).
An implication of this would be that unintended acts cannot be said to be the product of agency. When Laub and Sampson (2003), for example, refer to “desistance by default”—quitting crime without deliberating intending to or without one’s awareness—this is not by our understanding acting with agency.
This third criterion excluded 12 additional respondents who were either 11, 20, or 21 years old at wave 1. These respondents were not age-normative for grades 7–12.
One was added to each response so that the distribution began at one rather zero, and all values had a defined natural log.
All respondents in the core sample were of voting age (at least 18 years old) on that date.
This is calculated as 1−LL(model)/LL(null model) in a non-survey-adjusted model specification.
Except that coefficients for ethnicity and the school fixed effects were omitted to conserve space.
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Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Bill McCarthy, Jean McGloin, Alex Piquero and the anonymous reviewers for carefully reading the paper and offering many, many helpful suggestions. This research uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Persons interested in obtaining data files from Add Health should contact Add Health, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc.edu). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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Paternoster, R., Pogarsky, G. Rational Choice, Agency and Thoughtfully Reflective Decision Making: The Short and Long-Term Consequences of Making Good Choices. J Quant Criminol 25, 103–127 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9065-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9065-y
Keywords
- Deterrence
- Rational choice
- Agency
- Decision making
- Add Health