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Journal of Happiness Studies

, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 995–1013 | Cite as

Happiness, Dispositions and the Self

  • Søren Harnow KlausenEmail author
Research Paper

Abstract

I argue that happiness is an exclusively categorical mental state. Daniel Haybron’s inclusion of dispositions into his emotional state theory rests of a confusion of constituents of happiness in the narrow psychological sense with objects of prudential concern, to which obviously belong “mood propensities” and other dispositional states. I further argue that while it is probably correct to require of a constituent of happiness that it must in some sense be “deep” and belong to, or directly impact on, a persons’ self, the importance of depth may be overrated by the emotional state theory, which also ignores the possibility that mental states other than moods and emotions can be deep in the relevant sense.

Keywords

Definition of happiness Emotional state theory Happiness and the self Happiness and consciousness Hedonism Dispositions versus occurrent mental states Phenomenology of happiness 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department for the Study of Culture (Philosophy)University of Southern DenmarkOdense MDenmark

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