Abstract
Problem gambling is often accompanied by a range of irrational cognitions that promote excessive gambling. The cognitive basis for these beliefs has been largely overlooked in the gambling literature. Dual process theory suggests there are two parallel cognitive processing systems, an intuitive and an analytic system, and that there are potential individual differences in preference for one or the other cognitive style. The current study explored whether people’s cognitive styles are an important factor in the development of specific beliefs about gambling that in-turn contribute to gambling problems. The sample consisted of 1168 regular gamblers (539 female, ranging from 18 to 78 years of age; M = 35.47, SD = 10.78) recruited via Mechanical Turk. Participants completed a survey assessing cognitive style, problem gambling severity, and measures of protective and erroneous beliefs. In a path model, greater analytical thinking and lower intuitive thinking was associated with fewer erroneous gambling beliefs, which in turn were related to fewer gambling problems. A second model showed that protective beliefs also mediated the relationship between cognitive style and gambling, demonstrating that greater analytical thinking and lower intuitive thinking was associated with protective beliefs that similarly reduced problem gambling severity. Results suggest that a person’s cognitive style influences peoples gambling by contributing to the endorsement of irrational or unsafe beliefs about gambling. Encouraging people to think more analytically may be useful in reducing erroneous beliefs about gambling that promote problematic gambling behaviour.
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Notes
The online panel used in this study was derived from the American based Mechanical Turk™ platform.
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Part of this research was supported under the Commonwealth Government’s Research Training Program/Research Training Scheme. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Australian Government and Central Queensland University. Funding agencies have had no involvement in the research design, methodology, conduct, analysis or write-up of this manuscript.
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Tess Armstrong has received funding for her doctoral placement from the Australian Government via the RTS program, research funding from the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, and the National Association of Gambling Studies for conference attendance. Matthew Rockloff has received research grants from the Queensland Treasury, the Victorian Treasury, the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, the New Zealand Ministry of Health, the NSW Dept of Industry and Trade, the Department of Social Services, the Alberta Gambling Research Institute and Gambling Research Australia. He declares that he has no conflicts of interest in relation to this manuscript. Matthew Browne has received grants from the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, the New Zealand Ministry of Health the NSW Dept of Industry and Trade, the Department of Social Services, the Alberta Gambling Research Institute and Gambling Research Australia. He declares that he has no conflicts of interest in relation to this manuscript. For the period 2015–2018, Professor Blaszczynski has conducted research funded directly by Australian or international government, or government-related funding agencies, and industry operators. These include Gambling Research Exchange Ontario, ClubsNSW, Dooleys Club Lidcombe, Aristocrat Leisure Industries, Gaming Technologies Association, Gambling Research Australia, Responsible Wagering Australia, Commonwealth Bank, Crown Casino, NSW Department of Trade and Investment (NSW Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing), La Loterie Romande (Switzerland), Camelot (United Kingdom), La Française des Jeux (France), Loto-Quebec (Canada), and National Lottery (Belgium), Australian Communications and Media Authority’ and the National Association for Gambling Studies. He has received honorariums from Manitoba Gambling Research Program and GambleAware (formerly UK Responsible Gambling Trust) for grant reviews, and royalties from several publishers for books and book chapters. He has also received travel and accommodation expenses from Leagues Clubs, Gambling Research Exchange Ontario, USA National Council on Problem Gambling, Japan Medical Society for Behavioural Addiction, Le Comité d’organisation Congrès international sur les troubles addictifs, Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries, and New Horizons (British Columbia Lottery Corporation to attend conferences and meetings. All professional dealings have been conducted with the aim of enhancing responsible gambling and harm minimisation policies and practices, training counsellors in the treatment interventions, and advancing our understanding of the psychology of gambling.
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Armstrong, T., Rockloff, M., Browne, M. et al. Beliefs About Gambling Mediate the Effect of Cognitive Style on Gambling Problems. J Gambl Stud 36, 871–886 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10899-020-09942-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10899-020-09942-5