Skip to main content
Log in

Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games

  • Published:
Journal of Global Optimization Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We study cooperative transferable utility games with a communication structure represented by an undirected graph, i.e., a group of players can cooperate only if they are connected on the graph. This type of games is called graph games and the best-known solution for them is the Myerson value, which is characterized by the component efficiency axiom and the fairness axiom. Recently the average tree solution has been proposed on cycle-free graph games, and shown to be characterized by the component efficiency axiom and the component fairness axiom. We propose \({\epsilon}\) -parameterized fairness axiom on cycle-free graph games that incorporates the preceding fairness axioms, and show the existence and the uniqueness of the solution. We then discuss a relationship between the existing and our proposed solutions by a numerical example.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Berge C.: Graphs and Hypergraphs. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1973)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Borm P., Owen G., Tijs S.: On the position value for communication situations. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 5, 305–320 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Chinchuluun A., Pardalos P.M., Migdalas A., Pitsoulis L.: Pareto Optimality, Game Theory and Equilibria. Springer, Berlin (2008)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  4. Demange G.: On group stability in hierarchies and networks. J. Polit. Econ. 112, 754–778 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Herings P.J.J., van der Laan G., Talman A.J.J.: The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. Games Econ. Behav. 62, 77–92 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Herings P.J.J., van der Laan G., Talman A.J.J., Yang Z.: The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure. Games Econ. Behav. 68, 626–633 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Myerson R.B.: Graphs and cooperation in games. Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225–229 (1977)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Myerson R.B.: Conference structures and fair allocation rules. Int. J. Game Theory 9, 169–182 (1980)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Shapley L.S.: A value for n-person games. Ann. Math. Stud. 28, 307–317 (1953)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Slikker M., van den Nouweland A.: Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (2001)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Slikker M.: A characterization of the position value. Int. J. Game Theory 33, 505–514 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Talman A.J.J., Yamamoto Y.: Average tree solution and subcore for acyclic graph games. J. Oper. Res. Soc. Jpn 51, 203–212 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Y. Yamamoto.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ryuo, S., Sato, K. & Yamamoto, Y. Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games. J Glob Optim 52, 487–497 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-011-9761-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-011-9761-7

Keywords

Navigation