Abstract
Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) have famously served as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). The fine-grained version of the flicker defense has become one of the most popular responses to FSCs. Proponents of this defense argue that there is an alternative available to all agents in FSCs such that the cases do not show that PAP is false. Specifically, the agents could have done otherwise than decide on their own, and this available alternative is robust enough to ground moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that, when relying on definitions of ‘on one’s own’ within the literature on FSCs, a case can be constructed in which the agent could not have done otherwise than make a decision on his own. Insofar as this new case is successful, it will be able to avoid arguments about robustness while showing that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities of the type argued for by proponents of the fine-grained version of the flicker defense.
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Notes
The term “flickers of freedom” originated from Fischer (1994: 137–147).
Capes and Swenson (2017: 968, fn. 1) focus on the Mele and Robb case because, as they say, “we think that they have the best chance of avoiding various difficulties often thought to plague other Frankfurt cases.”
Where Robinson differs with Capes and Swenson is that Robinson argues the agent in an FSC is basically responsible for deciding on her own and derivatively responsible for deciding, while Capes and Swenson argue that the agent is only responsible for deciding on her own and not responsible for deciding because she could have avoided the former but not the latter.
Stump (1999: 317) suggests a case of this kind is possible.
Though Gary’s case is a fictional one, there are types of biofeedback where patients can learn to control what would otherwise be involuntary functions in the body, such as their heart rate. In neurofeedback, a type of biofeedback, patients can learn to control certain brainwaves, and this is similar to what Gary can do to a fantastic degree. See Hammond (2007) for more on neurofeedback. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify how D is produced.
The mechanism is intended to work the same as the mechanism in the Mele and Robb case. Just as P in the Mele and Robb case will cause Bob to decide at t2 to steal the car, unless Bob decides on his own at t2 to steal the car, D in the Gary case will cause him to decide at t2 to take his wife out to dinner, unless his decision is produced by his indeterministic deliberation at t2. See Mele and Robb (1998: 103–106) for a more detailed explanation of the mechanism.
Since my case is modeled after the Mele and Robb (1998) case, it is susceptible to a few non-flicker related objections. Perhaps the most contentious point is whether it is possible for the indeterministic process to preempt the deterministic process if both were to hit a “decision node” in the brain simultaneously. They defend their case from this objection and others in Mele and Robb (2003). The same type of preemption they argue for is defended in Schaffer (2000) and Lewis (2000).
Capes and Swenson (2017: 969) offer a similar definition.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify both Widerker’s position and my response.
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Acknowledgements
For helpful comments on this paper, I want to thank Al Mele, Sam Sims, Jay Spitzley, and an anonymous referee for this journal.
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Stockdale, B. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own. J Ethics 26, 27–40 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09353-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09353-z