Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves
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According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach.
KeywordsAnthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer Death Deprivation approach Jens Johansson Duncan Purves Time-relativity
Thanks to the participants in the Immortality Project’s Younger Scholars Workshop, especially to Ben Mitchell-Yellin, Duncan Purves, and Philip Swenson, for helpful discussion of an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks to John Fischer, too, for insightful comments on the paper.