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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 427–435 | Cite as

The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to Stump

  • Justin A. CapesEmail author
Article

Abstract

In a fascinating article in The Journal of Ethics, Eleonore Stump contends that while the flicker of freedom defense is the best available strategy for defending the principle of alternative possibilities against the threat posed to that principle by the Frankfurt cases, the defense is ultimately unsuccessful. In this article I identify a number of difficulties with Stump’s criticism of the flicker strategy. Along the way, I also clarify various nuances of the strategy that often get overlooked, and I highlight the advantages of one version of it in particular.

Keywords

Alternative possibilities Elenore Stump Flicker of freedom Frankfurt cases Moral responsibility 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and HumanitiesEast Tennessee State UniversityJohnson CityUSA

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