Abstract
The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement for prudential concern and whether a requirement for moral concern would follow from it. Section V examines the rationality of amoralists and partial amoralists, and Sect. VI closes with speculation on why there might seem to be a rational requirement to be morally motivated.
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Goldman, A.H. Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required?. J Ethics 14, 1–16 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9058-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9058-y