This paper studies how shifts in the distribution of quality on one side of the market affect earnings on the other side in a model of one-to-one matching. A more dispersed distribution of quality hurts the low ability agents on the other side because they are matched to inferior partners. Earnings being a differential rent in these markets, this pulls down the earnings of high quality agents as well. It is shown that a more dispersed ability distribution reduces total earnings on the opposite side of the market. Under some conditions, all agents on that side are hurt.
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Suen, W. The comparative statics of differential rents in two-sided matching markets. J Econ Inequal 5, 149–158 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-006-9034-8
- assignment model
- skill premium
- stochastic dominance