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Geography, institutions, and the making of comparative development

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Abstract

While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries, in former colonies, geography has also affected colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes. Using non-colonized countries as a control group, I re-examine the theories put forward by La Porta et al. (J Law Econ Org 15(1):222–279, 1999 and Acemoglu et al. (Am Econ Rev 91(5), 1369–1401, 2001. I find strong support for both theories, but also evidence that the authors’ estimates of the impact of colonization on institutions and growth are biased, since they confound the effect of the historical determinants of institutions with the direct impact of geographic endowments on development. In a baseline estimation, I find that the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2001) overestimates the importance of institutions for economic growth by 28 %, as a country’s natural disease environment affected settler mortality during colonization and also has a direct impact on prosperity. The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) underestimates the importance of colonization-imposed legal origin for institutional development by 63 %, as Britain tended to colonize countries that are remote from Europe and thus suffer from low access to international markets.

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Notes

  1. These two views of development are by no means exhaustive. Indeed, human capital, as proposed by the “Unified Growth Theory” (see Galor and Weil 1999; Galor and Moav 2002; Galor 2005, as well as parts of the empirical analysis in Glaeser et al. 2004), the origin of populations and their inherent “culture” (see Putterman and Weil 2010), and the genetic composition of the population (see Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009; Ashraf and Galor 2013) are equally fundamental forces of development. Spolaore and Waziarg (forthcoming) survey the evolution of the literature on comparative economic development over the last decade.

  2. In particular, Ashraf and Galor (forthcoming) argue that a major effect of geography worked indirectly via shaping the ancestral composition of current populations as they migrated in and out of Africa. Among others, they demonstrate that this composition has been a significant factor affecting the course of economic development “from the dawn of human civilization to the present” (see p. 9) also when controlling for institutional quality.

  3. As I argue below, adding controls for the potential direct effect of endowments to the empirical estimations does not alleviate this concern because these controls potentially also affect development both directly and indirectly via colonization policies. What is missing in the current literature is a clear control group that distinguishes the direct effect of endowments from the impact of colonization policies. I set out to build such a control group below.

  4. This basic insight is also related to the work of Nunn and Puga (2010), who demonstrate that the slave trade reversed the impact of internal transportation cost through the protection from slave traders provided by rugged terrain.

  5. The main reason to focus on using the dataset of Kaufmann et al. (2005) as opposed to alternative measures of institutional outcomes is that this dataset is reliable and available for a large set of countries. Acemoglu et al. (2001) use the variable “Protection from Expropriation” as their primary measure of institutional outcomes. The latter is taken from Political Risk Services and is available for 116 of the 151 countries examined in this study, with the most limiting fact being that it is only available for 37 non-colonies. La Porta et al.’s (1997) study of the effect of investor protection rights on external finance in 49 countries and also La Porta et al.’s (1998) study of law and finance covers this group of 49 countries. La Porta et al.’s (1999) study on the quality of government draws on the “Index of Economic Freedom” from the Heritage Foundation. The latter index is available for a large set of countries, but it could be argued that it is somewhat ideology-based (for example lower government spending is automatically associated with better institutional outcomes). In the working paper version of the paper, I document that the results presented below also hold when using “Constraints on the Executive” from the Polity IV database as a measure of institutional outcomes, which has also been used by Acemoglu et al. (2001).

  6. Table 9 in the working paper version of this paper presents various alternative classifications of former colonies, demonstrating that none of the results of this paper is dependent on the precise method of defining colonies assumed below.

  7. In Table 5, Malta and the Bahamas are missing from the sample of Acemoglu et al. (2001) because the respective populations of these two countries are smaller than 500,000 (see sample criterion). None of the results of this paper hinges on the exclusion of these two countries.

  8. Albouy (2012) also argues that since Acemoglu et al. (2001) extrapolate some of the mortality rates, standard errors need to be clustered in order to reflect the true number of observations. This is done in Columns (1)–(4) of Table 1.

  9. Figure 1 is constructed using a raw world map taken from the World Borders Dataset. The colonizer identity is constructed from a large set of historical sources reported in the Online Appendix of this paper.

  10. Figure 1 marks the US and Canada as being former UK colonies. Regarding the US, also the Netherlands, Spain, and France (and even Sweden and Russia to some extent) did launch major colonization efforts in North America. France and Spain formally claimed large territories that today lie within the borders of the USA. However, and in strong contrast to the UK colonies, these nations never had actual control over the claimed territories in the form of substantial settlements with economic activity. Because the nucleus of what is now known as the USA was under UK rule, the country is classified as having a UK colonial origin. Regarding Canada, the country was first colonized by France and French settlers also established the current settlements of Quebec and Nova Scotia. However, France never actually sent a substantial number of settlers to their settlements. Already in the 1680s, the French settlers were outnumbered ten to one by British settlers. Thus, also Canada is classified as a UK colony.

  11. Of all nations, why did Britain emerge as the dominant nation on the seas? Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that geography itself—combined with initial institutions—explains the rise of Britain. Britain’s geographic location predisposes it to becoming a naval power. Its coastline measures \(12,429\) km (\(8,982\) kilometers when counting only mainland England), as opposed to France’s coast, measuring \(3,427\) km in length (all coast lengths are measured on a \(20\)-km grid).

  12. The Netpas distance data, although officially termed “sailing distance”, in fact refers to the shortest route taken by modern combustion engine vessels. The resulting variable thus does not take into account the effect of wind strength and direction for the ease at which colonizers could arrive at the colonies (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009 document the importance of the latter factors for the timing of colonization). If a colony is landlocked, the distance to the nearest major port is used, and the shortest distance from the port to the colony via a major river, or, if this is not available, via roads is added to the pure sailing distance.

  13. Further examination, undertaken in the working paper version of this paper, demonstrates that the latter nations are also more distant from Europe in terms of geographic (instead of sailing) distance, geographically less open to trade, and located further away from the equator.

  14. In the working paper version of this paper, I also estimate richer geographic models and multinomial Probit estimation allowing for the colonial or legal origin to be French, British, Spanish, or “other”, where the “other” group includes countries with German, Scandinavian, or communist legal origins. Moreover, in these specifications, absolute and relative sailing distances are shown to have substantial explanatory power for the legal origin.

  15. When comparing the coefficients in Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) to the ones in (5) and (4), \(\theta _{R}=\widetilde{\theta }_{R}\widetilde{\theta } _{P}/\left( 1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }\right) \) and \(\nu _{R,i}=\left( \widetilde{\nu }_{Ri}+C_{i}\widetilde{\theta }_{R}\widetilde{\nu }_{Pi}\right) /\left( 1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }\right) \), demonstrating that there may be heteroskedasticity between the two groups of countries. All results presented below are thus estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

  16. These bounds are computed in the following way. Weil surveys the literature on the effect of height on earnings, finding that three different “methods for estimating the return to health characteristics produce a total of six estimates for the return to height: three from variation in childhood inputs (\(0.080\), \(0.094\), and \(0.078\)), two from twins (\(0.033\) and \(0.035\)), and one from long-run historical data (\(0.073\))” (see page \(1288\)). The return to height is expressed in the percentage increase of an individual’s wage per \(1\) cm of height. Second, Weil regresses the effect of ASR on height, finding a coefficient of between \(16.6\) and \(26.4\) (see his Table 2 on page \( 1291\)). Comparing these estimates reveals that a change in the ASR from \(0\) to \(1\) implies an income effect ranging from \(0.033*16.6=54.78\,\%\) to \(0.094*26.4=248.2\,\%\). Finally, taking into account the fact that the standard deviation of ASR in Weil’s sample ranges from \(0.13\) to \(0.18\) yields the numbers stated in the main text: from \(0.033*16.6*0.13\approx 7.1\,\%\) to \(0.094*26.4*0.18\approx 44.7\,\%\). The relevant figures from Bloom and Canning (2005) result in a \(95\,\%\) confidence interval of \(120\,\%\) to \(430\,\%\) for the coefficient of ASR on a worker’s income. Using this range and the standard deviation of ASR yields a range from \(15.6\,\%\) to \(77.4\,\%\).

  17. Segura-Cayuela (2006) argues that openness to trade can hurt a country’s institutional performance because liberalization removes general equilibrium price effects of expropriation. Heavily expropriated goods are expensive in a closed economy whereas the world market price is given in a small open economy. Liberalization thus enables groups with political power to engage more in costly expropriation.

  18. These numbers are calculated in the following way. Feyrer’s (2009a) highest estimate for the effect on growth of a \(1\,\%\) higher growth rate of trade is equal to \(0.754\). Feyrer’s (2009b) lowest estimate is equal to \(0.157\). A regression of the logarithm of trade on the logarithm of sailing distance to Europe, as defined above in Table 1, yields a coefficient of \(-3.01\); i.e., a \(1\,\%\) increase in sailing distance to Europe lowers trade by \(3.01\,\%\). In turn, the coefficient of Prop UK on Distance to Europe in a simple regression is equal to \(0.332\). Taking the bounds from Feyrer’s works and these coefficients yields bounds of \(-0.753\) (\(0.754*0.332*(-3.01)\)) and \(-0.157\) (\(0.157*0.332*(-3.01)\)).

  19. The two measures of proximity to either the UK or France have been derived from a multinomial Probit estimation allowing for the absolute and relative sailing distances to affect colonial origin. See the working paper version for the estimation results.

  20. This simple calculation of the importance of legal origin neglects the effect of the “other” (=non UK or French) legal origin dummy. The total effect of legal origin during colonization is equal to \(Contrib\_Legor = 2.52*\)Prob.Legor.UK”+\(0.33*\)Prob.Legor.UK”, but because the coefficient of “Prob.Legor.other” is small and that variable is close to \( 0 \) for most countries, the standard deviation of \(Contrib\_Legor\) is also equal to \(0.47\).

  21. Total Sum of Minerals is equal to the sum of the country’s share of world reserves in the 20 most important minerals (excluding oil).

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Acknowledgments

This is a substantially revised chapter of my 2006 PhD thesis. I thank Daron Acemoglu and Xavier Gabaix for discussions, guidance and support; the editor Oded Galor as well as three anonymous referees, Josh Angrist, Martin Brown, Sylvain Chassang, Emmanuel Farhi, Nicola Gennaioli, Werner Hermann, Simon Johnson, Mark Melitz, Marcel Peter, Philip Saure, Andrei Shleifer, David Weil, an anonymous referee at the Swiss National Bank’s working paper series, as well as seminar participants at ETH Zurich and the annual conferences of the American Economic Association, the European Economic Association, the European Development Network, the Econometric Society, and especially Gerard Padró i Miquel for helpful comments and discussions; and Domagoj Arapovic, Nicole Aregger, and Elisabeth Beusch for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Swiss National Bank.

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Appendix 1: Remark on the endogeneity of colonisation

Appendix 1: Remark on the endogeneity of colonisation

This remark and its proof show that the identification does not assume that colonization is orthogonal to either income or institutions. If colonization is correlated with \(\widetilde{\nu }_{Y,i}\) \(or \) \(\widetilde{\nu }_{R,i}\), the colony dummies \(\lambda _{Y}^{\prime } \) and \(\lambda _{R}^{\prime }\) are biased, but the other coefficients are not affected.

Remark 1

Assume that

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{\nu }_{R,i}=\gamma _{R}C_{i}+\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i} \text{ and} \widetilde{\nu }_{Y,i}=\gamma _{Y}C_{i}+\widetilde{\epsilon }_{Y,i}, \end{aligned}$$

where, by construction, \(\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i},\widetilde{\epsilon } _{Y,i}\) \(\perp C_{i}\). Denote the expectation of the two-stage least square point estimates of \(\theta _{R}\) and \(\alpha \) in the estimation of () and (5) by \(E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R} \right] \) and \(E\left[ \widehat{a}\right] \). It is true that

$$\begin{aligned} E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] \left|_{\gamma _{R\ne 0} \text{ or} \gamma _{Y\ne 0}}\right.&= E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] \left|_{\gamma _{R=0} \text{ and} \gamma _{Y=0}}\right. =\theta _{R} \\ E\left[ \widehat{a}\right] \left|_{\gamma _{R\ne 0} \text{ or} \gamma _{Y\ne 0}}\right.&= E\left[ \widehat{a}\right] \left|_{\gamma _{R=0} \text{ and} \gamma _{Y=0}}\right. \end{aligned}$$

Proof

Consider first the structural model (1) and (2), with the impact of colonization policies (3) netted into the determinants of the rule of law.

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i}&= \widetilde{\lambda }_{Y}+\widetilde{\delta }_{Y}C_{i}+\widetilde{ \alpha }R_{i}+\widetilde{\eta }_{Y}E_{i}+\widetilde{\nu }_{Y,i} \end{aligned}$$
(6)
$$\begin{aligned} R_{i}&= \widetilde{\lambda }_{R}+\widetilde{\delta }_{R}C_{i}+\widetilde{\eta }_{R}E_{i}+\widetilde{\beta }Y_{i}+C_{i}\widetilde{\theta }_{R}E_{i}+ \widetilde{\nu }_{R,i} \end{aligned}$$
(7)

The reduced from of the first stage (7) is

$$\begin{aligned} R_{i}=\lambda _{R}+\lambda _{R}^{\prime }C_{i}+\eta _{R}E_{i}+\theta _{R}C_{i}E_{i}+v_{R,i}, \end{aligned}$$

where \(\lambda _{R}=\frac{\widetilde{\lambda }_{R}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\lambda }_{Y}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}\), \( \lambda _{R}^{\prime }=\frac{\widetilde{\delta }_{R}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\delta }_{Y}+\widetilde{\beta }\gamma _{Y}+\gamma _{R}}{1- \widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}\), \(\eta _{R}=\frac{\widetilde{\eta } _{R}+\widetilde{\beta }\widetilde{\eta }_{Y}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha } \widetilde{\beta }}\), \(\theta _{R}=\frac{\widetilde{\theta }_{R}}{1- \widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}\) and \(v_{R,i}=\frac{\widetilde{\beta } \gamma _{Y}+\gamma _{R}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}C_{i}+\frac{ \widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta }\widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1- \widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}.\) If either \(\gamma _{Y}\ne 0\) or \( \gamma _{R}\ne 0\), \(v_{R,i}\) is correlated with the colonization dummy. Denote all estimated coefficients by a \(\widehat{}\) superscript. The four FOCs of the OLS minimization problem yield the following point estimates for the coefficients

$$\begin{aligned}&\widehat{\lambda }_{R}^{\prime }=\frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\left( Y_{i}-\left( \eta +\theta \right) X_{i}\right) }{N_{1}}-\frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( Y_{i}-\eta X_{i}\right) }{N-N_{1}} \text{ and} \widehat{\lambda }_{R}=\frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( Y_{i}-\eta X_{i}\right) }{N-N_{1}},\\&\widehat{\eta }_{R}=\frac{Cov\left(Y,X\vert D=0\right) }{ Var\left(X\vert D=0\right) } \text{ and} \widehat{\theta } _{R}=\frac{Cov\left(R,E\vert D=1\right) }{Var\left(E\vert D=1\right) }-\frac{Cov\left(R,E\vert D=0\right) }{Var\left( E\vert D=0\right) }. \end{aligned}$$

Due to the endogeneity of colonization, \(E\left[ \widehat{\lambda }^{\prime } \right] \ne \lambda _{R}^{\prime }\), but \(\widehat{\theta }_{R}\) is an unbiased estimator of \(\theta :\)

$$\begin{aligned} E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] =E\left[ \frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\left( Y_{i}-\overline{Y}_{D_{i}=1}\right) \left( E_{i}- \overline{E}_{D_{i}=1}\right) }{\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\left( E_{i}-\overline{E }_{D_{i}=1}\right) ^{2}}-\frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( Y_{i}-\overline{Y} _{D_{i}=0}\right) \left( E_{i}-\overline{E}_{D_{i}=0}\right) }{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( E_{i}-\overline{E}_{D_{i}=0}\right) ^{2}}\right] \end{aligned}$$

where \(\nu _{R,i}=\frac{\widetilde{\beta }\gamma _{Y}+\gamma _{R}}{1- \widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}C_{i}+\frac{\widetilde{\epsilon } _{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta }\widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha } \widetilde{\beta }}\), \(\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\frac{\nu _{R,i}}{N_{1}}=\frac{ \widetilde{\beta }\gamma _{Y}+\gamma _{R}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{ \beta }}+\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{ \beta }\widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }} \frac{1}{N_{1}}\), and \(\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\frac{\nu _{R,i}}{N_{1}}=\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}\frac{1 }{N-N_{1}}\). By construction,

$$\begin{aligned} E\left[ \left( \frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}-\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\frac{\frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}}{N_{1}} \right) \left( E_{i}-\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\frac{E_{i}}{N_{1}}\right) \right]&= 0 \\ E\left[ \left( \frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}-\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\frac{\frac{\widetilde{\epsilon }_{R,i}+\widetilde{\beta } \widetilde{\epsilon _{Y,i}}}{1-\widetilde{\alpha }\widetilde{\beta }}}{ N-N_{1}}\right) \left( E_{i}-\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\frac{E_{i}}{N-N_{1}} \right) \right]&= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, \(E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] =\theta _{R}\) holds for any combination of \(\gamma _{R}\) and \(\gamma _{Y}\). Consequently, it is also true that \(\frac{\partial E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] }{\partial \gamma _{R}}=\frac{\partial E\left[ \widehat{\theta }_{R}\right] }{\partial \gamma _{Y}}=0\). Next, consider the second-stage estimate of \(\alpha \), \( \widehat{\alpha }\). This coefficient for the rule of law is part of the solution to the second-stage least square minimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{\widehat{\lambda _{Y}},\widehat{\lambda _{Y}^{\prime }},\widehat{ \alpha },\widehat{\eta }_{Y}}{\min }\sum \limits _{i}\left( Y_{i}-\left( \widehat{\lambda _{Y}}+\widehat{\lambda _{Y}^{\prime }}C_{i}+\widehat{\alpha }\overrightarrow{R_{i}}+\widehat{\eta }_{Y}E_{i}\right) \right) ^{2} \end{aligned}$$
(8)

where \(\overrightarrow{R_{i}}\) is the projection of \(R_{i}\) obtained from the first stage. It is important to note that since the colony dummy \( \widehat{\lambda }_{R}^{\prime }\) in the first-stage estimation is biased, it is not true that \(E\left[ \overrightarrow{R_{i}}\right] =E\left[ R_{i} \right] \). This has, however, no consequence for \(\widehat{\alpha }\), which depends only on with-group variations and covariances. The FOCs of the minimization problem (8) yield

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\lambda }_{R}^{\prime }&= \frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=1}\left( Y_{i}- \widehat{\alpha }\overrightarrow{R_{i}}-\widehat{\eta }_{Y}X_{i}\right) }{N_{1}}-\frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( Y_{i}-\widehat{\alpha }\widetilde{R_{i}}-\widehat{\eta }_{Y}X_{i}\right) }{N-N_{1}},\end{aligned}$$
(9)
$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\lambda }_{R}&= \frac{\sum \limits _{i,D=0}\left( Y_{i}-\widehat{ \alpha }\widetilde{R_{i}}-\widehat{\eta }_{Y}X_{i}\right) }{N-N_{1}}, \end{aligned}$$
(10)
$$\begin{aligned} 0&= \sum \limits _{i}\overrightarrow{R_{i}}\left( Y_{i}-\left( \widehat{ \lambda _{Y}}+\widehat{\lambda _{Y}^{\prime }}C_{i}+\widehat{\alpha } \widetilde{R_{i}}+\widehat{\eta }_{Y}E_{i}\right) \right) , \end{aligned}$$
(11)
$$\begin{aligned} 0&= \sum \limits _{i}E_{i}\left( Y_{i}-\left( \widehat{\lambda _{Y}}+ \widehat{\lambda _{Y}^{\prime }}C_{i}+\widehat{\alpha }\widetilde{R_{i}}+ \widehat{\eta }_{Y}E_{i}\right) \right). \end{aligned}$$
(12)

Define the following average within-group covariances and average within-group variances.

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{Cov}\left( Y,E\right)&\equiv \left( N-N_{1}\right) \left( Cov\left( \left. Y,E\right|D=0\right) \right) +N_{1}\left( Cov\left( \left. Y,E\right|D=1\right) \right) \\ \widetilde{Cov}\left( Y,\overrightarrow{R_{i}}\right)&\equiv \left( N-N_{1}\right) \left( Cov\left( \left. Y,\overrightarrow{R_{i}}\right|D=0\right) \right) +N_{1}\left( Cov\left( \left. Y,\overrightarrow{R_{i}} \right|D=1\right) \right) \\ \widetilde{Cov}\left( \overrightarrow{R_{i}},E\right)&\equiv \left( N-N_{1}\right) Cov\left( \left. \overrightarrow{R_{i}},E\right|D=0\right) +N_{1}\left( Cov\left( \left. \overrightarrow{R_{i}},E\right|D=1\right) \right) \\ \widetilde{Var}\left( E\right)&\equiv \left( N-N_{1}\right) Var\left( \left. E\right|D=0\right) +N_{1}Var\left( \left. E\right|D=1\right) \\ \widetilde{Var}\left( \overrightarrow{R_{i}}\right)&\equiv \left( N-N_{1}\right) Var\left( \left. \overrightarrow{R_{i}},E\right|D=0\right) +N_{1}Var\left( \left. \overrightarrow{R_{i}},E\right|D=1\right) \end{aligned}$$

These variances and covariances equal the standard definitions, except that the across-group differences in the mean between noncolonies and colonies are netted out. For example, the average within-group variance of \(R_{i}\) is equal to the variance of \(R_{i}\) in the entire sample if the mean of \(R\) is equal in former colonies and in the noncolonies. With this notation, the point estimate of \(\alpha \) equals

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\alpha }=\frac{\widetilde{Var}\left( E\right) \widetilde{Cov}\left( Y,R\right) -\widetilde{Cov}\left( Y,E\right) \widetilde{Cov}\left( R,E\right) }{\widetilde{Var}\left( E\right) \widetilde{Var}\left( R\right) -\left( \widetilde{Cov}\left( R,E\right) \right) ^{2}} \end{aligned}$$
(13)

Due to the presence of the standard small-sample instrumental variable bias, it is not generally true that \(E\left[ \widehat{\alpha }\right] =\alpha \). However, since all of the elements in (13) depend exclusively on the within-group variation, the small sample bias of \(\widehat{\alpha }\) is not affected by the endogeneity of colonization; i.e., \(\frac{\partial E \left[ \widehat{\alpha }\right] }{\partial \gamma _{R}}=\frac{\partial E \left[ \widehat{\alpha }\right] }{\partial \gamma _{Y}}=0.\) \(\square \)

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Auer, R. Geography, institutions, and the making of comparative development. J Econ Growth 18, 179–215 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-013-9087-z

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