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Equivalence of two-sided stable matching

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Abstract

In this article, we study a one-to-many two-sides matching problem. This one-to-many two-sides matching problem can be converted into one-to-one two-sides matching problem, and the equivalence between them is proved.

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Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Item Numbers: 71371120, 71520107003) as well as the Shanghai Science Committee of China (Item Number: 17495810500). We would like to express our heartfelt thanks.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China

    Liwei Zhong & Yanqin Bai

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  1. Liwei Zhong
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  2. Yanqin Bai
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Correspondence to Yanqin Bai.

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Zhong, L., Bai, Y. Equivalence of two-sided stable matching. J Comb Optim 36, 1380–1387 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0308-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0308-4

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