Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption

  • Gregory WheelerEmail author


A bounded formula is a pair consisting of a propositional formula φ in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate, interpreted to express the lower-bound probability of φ. Converting conjunctive/disjunctive combinations of bounded formulas to a single bounded formula consisting of the conjunction/disjunction of the propositions occurring in the collection along with a newly calculated lower probability is called absorption. This paper introduces two inference rules for effecting conjunctive and disjunctive absorption and compares the resulting logical system, called System Y, to axiom System P. Finally, we demonstrate how absorption resolves the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preference.


probabilistic logic rational acceptance the lottery paradox System P bounded uncertain reasoning 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Artificial Intelligence Center, CENTRIA, Department of Computer ScienceUniversidade Nova de LisboaCaparicaPortugal

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