Abstract
Some scientists or philosophers argue that multiverse theories are unfalsifiable and thus not scientific. However, some advocates of multiverse theories have recently argued that although the multiverse is not observable, multiverse theories are indeed falsifiable in principle. Therefore, they share similar features with a conventional scientific theory. On the other hand, the proposals of an epistemic shift and nonempirical theory assessment have possibly revived the discussions of the scientific nature of multiverse theories. In this article, I revisit the falsifiable arguments made by the advocates of multiverse theories and show that these arguments do not justify arguing the scientific nature of such theories. Moreover, even if we accept the proposals of the epistemic shift and the nonempirical theory assessment, I argue that multiverse theories still cannot pass or satisfy the required assessments based on the new theoretical virtues and the nonempirical arguments.
Notes
The quote appears in the abstract of the article. However, the article published in the book does not have the abstract. It only appears in the article published in arXiv:1801.05016.
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The work described in this paper was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. EdUHK 18606721).
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Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. EdUHK 18606721).
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Chan, M. Revisiting the Scientific Nature of Multiverse Theories. J Gen Philos Sci 55, 137–151 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09644-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09644-7