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Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 279–299 | Cite as

Causality, Teleology, and Thought Experiments in Biology

  • Marco BuzzoniEmail author
Article

Abstract

Thought experiments (henceforth TEs) de facto play many different roles in biology: economical, ethical, technical and so forth. This paper, however, is interested in whether there are any distinctive features of biological TEs as such. The question may be settled in the affirmative because TEs in biology have a function that is intimately connected with the epistemological and methodological status of biology. Peculiar to TEs in biology is the fact that the reflexive, typically human concept of finality may be profitably employed to discover mechanical-experimental causal relations in all living beings—with the obvious caveat that we do not hypostatise and interpret this concept as an ontological quality, since this would land one in an implicitly animistic, pre-Galilean view of nature. From a methodical point of view, the concept of finality is an essential assumption as well as a powerful heuristic tool in the practice of biology, that is, in the investigation of living beings in an intersubjectively testable and reproducible way.

Keywords

Thought experiment in biology Teleology Experiment Mechanism 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper has greatly profited from two research stays at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Essen-Duisburg (Germany), in January 2010 and in July 2011, supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Previous versions of this paper were presented as talks at the University of Duisburg-Essen (“Teleologie und Kausalität in der Biologie”, January, 2010, and “Die Grenzen der ‘Evolutionären Wissenschaftstheorie’ und das Problem des wissenschaftlichen und methodologischen Status der Biologie”, July, 2011) and at the 39th annual philosophy of science conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia (April 16–20, 2012). The ensuing discussions were helpful for honing some of the theses presented in that occasion and now upheld in this paper: Dirk Hartmann, his excellent scientific staff and his graduate students, and all those who contributed to the discussion of my paper at the conference in Dubrovnik, deserve particular thanks. Thanks to Mike Stuart for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for a number of useful criticisms and suggestions.

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Università di MarcerataMacerataItaly

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