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Saving Mach’s View on Atoms

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Abstract

According to a common belief concerning the Mach-Boltzmann debate on atoms, the new experiments performed in microphysics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries confirmed Boltzmann’s atomic hypothesis and disproved Mach’s anti-atomic view. This paper intends to show that this belief is partially unjustified. Mach’s view on atoms consists in fact of different kinds of arguments. While the new experiments in microphysics refute indeed his scientific arguments against the atomic hypothesis, his epistemological arguments are unaffected. In this regard, Mach’s epistemological approach remains relevant for today’s discussion on the status of the notion of atom.

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Notes

  1. For simplicity, let us disregard what happened in the domain of chemistry.

  2. On the history of this theory, see Brush (1976).

  3. Concerning these experiments with scanning tunnelling and atomic force microscopes, see for instance Pullman (1995), Chap. XIX, Sect. 6.

  4. Boltzmann was succeeding Mach at the professorship of natural philosophy.

  5. In this paper, the term “phenomenon” will be assumed to refer to an event or a process perceptible by the senses.

  6. Bradley (1971, Sect. 7.10.3) emphasises that Mach assigned to these two kinds of objects (tables and atoms) the same ontological status.

  7. Most often, Mach made use of the word “element” instead of “sensation”. This was to stress the fact that one should speak of “sensations” only in a specific case: “These elements depend both on external and internal circumstances; when the latter are involved, and only then, we may call these elements sensations” (1976 [1905], p. 6). These “internal circumstances” refer to the elements K, L, M… belonging to the complex of elements called “body”. It is only if the elements noted A, B, C… are considered in their relation of “functional dependency” with elements K, L, M…, that the elements A, B, C… are called “sensations” (see Mach 1996 [1900], p. 16; 1992 [1910], pp. 118–119).

  8. In this regard, Mach can be viewed as a “constructivist”.

  9. On this point, Mach was influenced by his readings of Kant who supported that objective knowledge of the things in themselves is impossible since they are outside the scope of any possible experience. According to Mach, however, Kant should have been more radical by rejecting the very notion of a thing in itself and restrain his epistemology to the phenomena (see for instance 1996 [1900], p. 30n). For a discussion of this point, see Lahbib (2003, pp. 14–15).

  10. In this regard, Mach can also be viewed as a “phenomenalist”.

  11. Recall that Mach was first of all an “empiricist”.

  12. Mach assumed that “sensations” are the most fundamental elements of our experience. Note nonetheless that he considered this idea as a tentative working hypothesis. He did not rule out the possibility that the analysis of the sensations will be developed further in the future (see e.g. 1996 [1900], pp. 22 and 32 or 1976 [1905], p. 6 and p. 12, note 7).

  13. Note that to describe potential phenomena amounts to anticipate these phenomena. In this respect, the aim of science in Mach’s view is not strictly descriptive but also predictive. On this point, see Cohen (1968, pp. 142–144).

  14. See also Ghins (2003).

  15. For a comparison of these authors, see Brenner (1998–1999) and Sebestik (1998–1999).

  16. On this point, see also Ghins (2003, pp. 12–14).

  17. Because of his hostility against metaphysics, Mach is also viewed as a “positivist”.

  18. On this point, see Ghins (2003, p. 10).

  19. This number is defined today as the number of atoms in 12 grams of carbon (isotope 12) and is approximately equal to 6.022 × 1023.

  20. For a discussion on van Fraassen’s notion of “observability”, see Churchland and Hooker (1985).

  21. Van Fraassen doesn’t state this idea explicitly, but it appears in his writings as a tacit assumption (see 1980, pp. 15–19).

  22. At least, this is what we should conclude if we endorse van Fraassen’s view supported in 1980, pp. 10–11 and 72.

  23. According to Falkenburg’s “general observation criterion” (2006, p. 71), in the frame of the kinetic theory of gases, atoms cannot even be considered as being subject to a “generalized” observation in the sense that there is no “individual causal story […] which shows that the measured quantities [i.e. the phenomena accounted for by the kinetic theory of gases] can indeed be attributed to an individual system [i.e. in our case, to an individual atom] located in a certain spacetime region, accessible to the actual measuring device”.

  24. See for instance Hughes (1989, Chap. 3), van Fraassen (1991, Chap. 6), Bitbol (1996, Sect. 2.2) and Bächtold (2008a).

  25. On this point, see Falkenburg (2007, pp. 190–194 and 206) and Bächtold (2008b, Sect. 3.4).

  26. This is a consequence of the contextuality of quantum mechanics. See the proof of Kochen and Specker (1967), or the simpler ones of Mermin (1990) and Peres (1990).

  27. Concerning Boltzmann’s epistemology, see for instance Lindley (2001), Blackmore (1995) and Cercignani (1998).

  28. By focusing on observable magnitudes, Heisenberg followed the methodology applied by Einstein when he founded special and general relativity, while Einstein’s methodology was an explicit application of Mach’s epistemology. In this respect, Mach’s influence on Heisenberg was indirect (i.e. via Einstein). Furthermore, this influence concerned the methodology applied for the construction of physical theories, but not the interpretation of the latter. Indeed, Heisenberg denied his affiliation to Mach’s epistemology, or more generally, to positivism (see 1969, Chap. XVII).

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    Manuel Bächtold

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Bächtold, M. Saving Mach’s View on Atoms. J Gen Philos Sci 41, 1–19 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9109-x

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