Summary
In the biological realm, a complete explanation of a trait seems to include an explanation in terms of function. It is natural to ask of some trait, “What is its function?” or “What purpose in the organism does the particular trait serve?” or “What is the goal of its activity?” There are several views concerning the appropriate definition of function for biological matters. Two popular views of function with respect to living things are Cummins’ organizational account and the Griffiths/Godfrey-Smith modern history account. Whereas Cummins argues that a trait functions so as to contribute to the general organization of some organism’s present structure, Griffiths, and Godfrey-Smith argue that a trait functions because of its fitness with respect to the organism’s recent evolutionary history. In this paper, I show how these accounts can be made compatible and compliment one another. Given that structure, organization, operational flexibility, function, and evolutionary history are all factors to be considered in an organism’s makeup, we should expect that the traits of an organism function the way they do because such traits presently contribute to the overall organization of the organism (Cummins) as well as were selected for in the organism’s species’ recent ancestry (Griffiths/Godfrey-Smith).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Achinstein P. (1977), ‘Function Statements’, Philosophy of Science. 44: 341–367
Allen C., Bekoff M., Lauder G. (1998), ‘Introduction’. In: Allen C., Bekoff M., Lauder G. (eds). Natures Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA, pp. 1–26
Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). (2002), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Arnhart L. (1998), Darwinian Natural Right. SUNY Press, Binghamton, NY
Arp R. (2005a), ‘Scenario Visualization: One Explanation of Creative Problem Solving’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12, 31–60
Arp, R.: 2005b, ‘Selectivity, Integration, and the Psycho-neuro-biological Continuum’, Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 and 7, 35–64.
Arp R. (2005c), ‘The Pragmatic Value of Frege’s Platonism for the Pragmatist’. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19, 22–41
Arp R. (2005d), ‘Frege, as-if Platonism, and Pragmatism’. Journal of Critical Realism 9, 1–27
Arp R. (2006), ‘The Environments of our Hominin Ancestors, Tool Usage, and Scenario Visualization’. Biology and Philosophy 21, 95–117
Ayala F. (1998), ‘Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology’. In: Allen C., Bekoff M., Lauder G. (eds). Nature’s Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 29–49
Bechtel W. (1989), ‘Functional Analyses and their Justification’. Biology and Philosophy 4, 159–162
Berra T. (1990), Evolution and the Myth of Creationism. Stanford University Press, Stanford
Bigelow J., Pargetter R. (1998), ‘Functions’. In: Allen C. (eds). Nature’s Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 241–259
Bogdan R. (1994), Grounds for Cognition: How Goal-Guided Behavior Shapes the Mind. LEA Publishers, Hillsdale, CA
Boorse C. (2002), ‘A Rebuttal on Functions’. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 63–112
Buller D. (1999), ‘Natural Teleology’. In: Buller D. (eds). Function, Selection, and Design. SUNY Press, Binghamton, NY, pp. 1–27
Churchland P.M. (1989), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA
Churchland P.S. (1986), Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Churchland P.S. (1993), ‘The Co-Evolutionary Research Ideology’. In: Goldman A. (eds). Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 745–767
Collier J. (2000), ‘Autonomy and Process Closure as the Basis of Functionality’. In: Chandler J., van de Vijver G. (eds). Closure: Emergent Organizations and their Dynamics. Annals of the New York Academy of Science, New York, pp. 280–291
Cummins R. (1975), ‘Functional Analyses’. Journal of Philosophy 72, 741–765
Cummins R. (2002), ‘Neo-teleology’. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 157–172
Darwin C. (1859/1999), The Origin of Species by Natural Selection: Or, The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. Bantam Books, New York
Dawkins R. (1986), The Blind Watchmaker. W.W. Norton and Company, New York
Dennett D. (1987), The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Dennett D. (1991), Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company, Boston
Dobzhansky T. (1937), Genetics and the Origin of Species. Columbia University Press, New York
FitzPatrick W. (2000), Teleology and the Norms of Nature. Garland Publishing, New York
Glennan S. (1996), ‘Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation’. Erkenntnis 44, 49–71
Godfrey-Smith P. (1993), ‘Functions: Consensus Without Unity’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74, 196–208
Godfrey-Smith P. (1994), ‘A Modern History Theory of Functions’. Nous 28, 344–362
Godfrey-Smith P. (1996), Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Gould S. (1977), Ever Since Darwin. W.W. Norton and Company, New York
Gould S., Vrba E. (1982), ‘Exaptation: A Missing Term in the Science of Form’. Paleobiology 1.8, 4–15
Griffiths P. (1992), ‘Adaptive Explanation and the Concept of a Vestige’. In: Griffiths P. (eds). Trees of Life: Essays in Philosophy of Biology. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 111–131
Griffiths P. (1993), ‘Functional Analysis and Proper Function’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 409–422
Griffiths P. (1996), ‘The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 511–532
Hardcastle V. (1999), ‘Understanding Functions: A Pragmatic Approach’. In: Hardcastle V. (eds). Where Biology Meets Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 27–43
Hempel C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation. The Free Press, New York
Horan B. (1989), ‘Functional Explanations in Sociobiology’. Biology and Philosophy 4, 131–158
Kant I. (1790 / 1987), Critique of Judgment. W. Pluhar (trans.). Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IN
Lennox J. (1993), ‘Darwin was a Teleologist’. Biology and Philosophy 8, 409–421
Machamer P., Darden L., Craver C. (2000), ‘Thinking About Mechanisms’. Philosophy of Science 67, 1–25
Mahner M., Bunge M. (2001), ‘Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective’. Philosophy of Science 68, 75–94
Mayr E. (1982), The Growth of Biological Thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Mayr E. (1988), Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Mayr E. (1996), ‘The Autonomy of Biology: The Position of Biology Among the Sciences’. Quarterly Review of Biology 71, 98–106
Millikan R. (1984), Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Millikan R. (1989), ‘In Defense of Proper Functions’. Philosophy of Science 56, 288–302
Millikan R. (2002), ‘Biofunctions: Two Paradigms’. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds.). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 113–143
Nagel E. (1961), The Structure of Science. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York
Neander K. (1991), ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense’. Philosophy of Science 58, 168–184
Neander K. (1999), ‘Is Teleosemantics Adaptationist?’. In: Hardcastle V. (eds). Where Biology Meets Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–26
Ostrom J. (1979), ‘Bird Flight: How Did it Begin?’. American Scientist 67, 46–56
Perlman M. (2004), ‘The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology’. The Monist 87, 3–51
Plotkin H. (1997), Evolution in Mind: An Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Ruse M. (1971), ‘Functional Statements in Biology’. Philosophy of Science 38, 87–95
Ruse M. (1973), The Philosophy of Biology. Hutchinson, London
Ruse M. (2003), Darwin and Design: Does Evolution have a Purpose?. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Schwartz P. (2002), ‘The Continuing Usefulness Account of Proper Function’. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 244–260
Searle J. (1990), ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’. In: Cohen P., Pollack M., Morgan J. (eds). Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 401–414
Sober E. (1993), Philosophy of Biology. Westview Press, Boulder, CO
Staddon J. (1987), ‘Optimality Theory and Behavior’. In: Dupre J. (eds). The Latest of the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 34–63
Sterelny K. (2001), The Evolution of Agency and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Sterelny K., Griffiths P. (1999), Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Stout R. (1996), Things That Happen Because They Should: A Teleological Approach to Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Tabery J. (2004), ‘Synthesizing Activities and Interactions in the Concept of a Mechanism’. Philosophy of Science 71, 1–15
Tattersall I. (2001), ‘How We Came to be Human’. Scientific American 285, 57–63
Tattersall I. (2002), The Monkey in the Mirror: Essays on the Science of What Makes us Human. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Trivers R. (1985), Social Evolution. Benjamin-Cummings, Menlo Park, CA
Walters C. (1998), ‘Causal Regularities in the Biological World of Contingent Distributions’. Biology and Philosophy 13, 5–36
Wright L. (1973), ‘Functions’. Philosophical Review 82, 139–168
Wright L. (1976), Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions. University of California Press, Berkeley
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Arp, R. Evolution and Two Popular Proposals for the Definition of Function. J Gen Philos Sci 38, 19–30 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-9008-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-9008-3