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Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science

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Summary

Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, DK 2300, 2300 S, Copenhagen, DK, Denmark

    Keld Stehr Nielsen

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  1. Keld Stehr Nielsen
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Nielsen, K.S. Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science. J Gen Philos Sci 37, 139–163 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0487-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0487-z

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