Journal of Bioeconomics

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 71–81 | Cite as

Sustainable cooperation needs tinkering with both rules and social motivation

  • Siegwart LindenbergEmail author

“Coping with potential tragedies of the commons is never easy and never finished.” Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 286)

The tragedy of the commons seems to be in large part a tragedy of cooperative systems that are taken over by the outside (Klooster 2000). The paradigmatic case is irrigation systems, for which there is overwhelming evidence that the farmer-managed systems (FMIS) outperform the (government)agency-managed systems (AMIS) on virtually all counts (Lam 1996; Ostrom, this issue). Cooperation is more effective and sustainable among the former compared to the latter. Dealing with this insight has changed institutional analysis in important ways and continues to exert pressure to adapt the behavioral theories to be able to cope with the intricacies of sustainable cooperation (see for example Anderies et al. 2011; Lindenberg and Foss 2011). Rules of the game are normally taken to constitute the game, so that if we want to study the dynamics of the game, we take the rules as given. More...


Transformational Leader Internal Factor Social Motivation Common Pool Resource Joint Production 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Tilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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