Journal of Bioeconomics

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 3–30 | Cite as

Do institutions for collective action evolve?

  • Elinor Ostrom


In this paper I will provide an overview of our findings from studying irrigation systems in the field so that readers who are not familiar with our prior research gain at least an initial sense of these findings. I will provide a second short overview —this time of the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework offering a general method for doing institutional analysis. I will then introduce the possibility of looking at the change of rules as an evolutionary process. The method for studying the evolution of rules will be based on the IAD framework and on our long-term study of rules related to irrigation systems. In the conclusion, I return to the question as to why it is important to authorize resource users’ relative autonomy in the development of their own rules and to learn from the resulting institutional diversity.


Institutions Institutional change Rule diversity Evolution  Irrigation systems 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 2
    • 1
  1. 1.Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA
  2. 2.Center for the Study of Institutional DiversityArizona State UniversityTempeUSA

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