Labor markets and mating markets: Using taxes to reduce the male–female pay gap

Abstract

Recently, Frank and McKenzie (J Bioecon 8(3):269–274, 2006) pointed out that beside discrimination, there is a further reason for a wage gap between males and females: If females value partner wages more than males in the mating market, this would increase the pay gap. In this paper, it is analyzed whether there exist policies that may improve the position of females and males from a distributional point of view without destroying the signal females want about the labor market success of males. First-best redistribution policies require the knowledge of the male and female wage preferences. Because this information is not available, a first-best redistribution policy seems infeasible. As an alternative policy, a differentiated wage tax is considered which is less information demanding than a first-best policy. It is shown that a welfare increasing wage tax scheme does exist and that an adequately chosen wage tax scheme may decrease the gender wage gap without destroying the desired signal of wages for labor market success.