Skip to main content

Save the Meat for Cats: Why It’s Wrong to Eat Roadkill

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics volume 32, pages 165–182 (2019)Cite this article

Abstract

Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. But this argument works only if the following claims are true: (1) all humans have access to roadkill, (2) roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don’t themselves consume it, (3) it’s impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, (4) the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and (5) the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each of these claims are deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

£ 29.95

Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Notes

  1. Bruckner also discusses what he refers to as the second most “popular and convincing” argument for vegetarianism: the “Environmental Harm Argument.” This argument focuses on the harm animal agriculture causes to the environment. Bruckner claims that this argument, too, implies that it’s morally obligatory to supplement our diets with roadkill, since crop farming causes more environmental harm than does roadkill collection. My focus is specifically on the Factory Harm Argument. I argue that the Factory Harm Argument does not entail that individuals should eat roadkill. At times, I use Bruckner’s discussion of the Environmental Harm Argument to support my argument.

  2. Bruckner is in the company of Milburn (2017) and Fischer (2018), who argue that it’s permissible to eat roadkill or animal flesh obtained through dumpster diving.

  3. Bruckner suggests that individuals who collect and consume roadkill relocate the parts of the animals unfit for human consumption to environments where they can be scavenged. He claims that if this is done, scavengers would benefit from his proposal.

  4. Although the target of his project are vegetarians, his argument might also apply to vegans, i.e., those who eat only plant-based foods. But since Bruckner talks in terms of “vegetarianism,” I will also do so.

  5. At times, Bruckner specifically uses the term “individuals” when discussing the alleged duty to collect roadkill for consumption (2015, 33, 44).

  6. For a more detailed description of these harms, see Singer (1975) and Rachels (2011).

  7. Because 99% of animal products sold in supermarkets come from industrial animal farms, the average meat-eater surely consumes animals who were fed diets of industrial produced plants (as opposed to grass-fed animals).

  8. Not all animal sanctuaries accept roadkill donations. The Wild Animal Sanctuary (2013) in Colorado, for instance, says on their website that “[w]e do not take in road-kill or any other kind of carcass animals since they are not fresh, or safe, for our animals to eat. Dead animals can bring in all sorts of fleas, ticks and other parasites—which can cause a lot of medical problems for our animals.” But moral agents nevertheless have a duty to familiarize themselves with the policies of their local animal sanctuaries and wildlife rehabilitation centers when they happen upon roadkill, just like moral agents have a duty to familiarize themselves with the policies of domestic violence shelters, if they happen upon victims of domestic abuse. And if this is too much to ask, surely, it’s too much to ask an individual to collect and butcher roadkill.

  9. And if this suggestion seems implausible, it’s worth noting that, in some states such as New York, roadkill is often collected for Mexican gray wolf reintroduction programs.

  10. As Bruckner (2015, 36) puts it, “[e]veryone seems to agree that extensive harm is done to animals in the production of vegetables”.

  11. I assume Singer’s (1975) compelling claims that (1) only beings with interests can be harmed, and (2) only sentient beings (i.e., beings with the capacity for suffering and enjoying things) have interests.

  12. Bruckner himself seems to equate harm with pain and/or suffering, and not once does he suggest that the premature death of an animal is itself a harm. In his description of the Factory Harm Argument, the harms that Bruckner describes are felt harms. For example, he mentions the harms of food and water deprivation, painful mutilations, chronic respiratory diseases, intensive confinement, all of which cause pain and/or suffering to animals. Although he also mentions that industrial animal farming prevents animals from engaging in species-specific behavior, if this is a harm, arguably it is because depriving animals of the opportunity to engage in species-specific behavior causes frustration, which is itself a form of suffering.

  13. For example, see The Gardner’s A-Z Guide to Growing Organic Food.

  14. Or, Bruckner could modify his conclusion to this: if (1) one chooses to eat a well-rounded diet, (2) it’s permissible to pursue the means necessary to eating a well-rounded diet, (3) one cannot eat a well-rounded diet by growing one’s own food and/or by purchasing it from community gardens, (4) one happens upon roadkill, and (5) one has the means of transporting, butchering, and storing the roadkill, then (5) one ought to collect and consume roadkill.

  15. Even if this practice turns out to be good, it doesn’t follow from this that it’s obligatory. That is, there is no moral duty to enlarge plant production so to bring more field animals into existence. After all, the harm principle doesn’t require that we benefit others; it just requires that we abstain from causing extensive and unnecessary harm (and that we refrain from supporting practices that cause such harm).

  16. Certain forms of plant production are problematic, such as those that destroy current animal habitat. So, if plant agriculture requires the expansion of cropland by means of destroying perfectly good animal habitat, Bruckner’s argument would be more compelling. But he hasn’t made the case that this is inherent to industrial plant agriculture.

  17. Thus, one cannot justify eating roadkill by claiming that doing so is a sign of respect for animals and that it would be the epitome of disrespect to waste their bodies by throwing them in landfills. After all, it’s unlikely than one would attempt to justify eating human corpses by appealing to the “waste argument.” Moreover, what I’ve argued does not imply that roadkill should just be thrown in landfills. As I’ve argued, individuals who happen upon roadkill and have the means of transporting it should donate the roadkill to animal sanctuaries. And if that’s not possible, perhaps they should bury the carcasses as a sign of respect.

  18. Sue Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013, 152) express a similar concern about the production of cultured meat.

  19. Bruckner addresses a similar, but different concern in his paper. He considers this objection: eating roadkill will lead us to desire to eat more meat, and this desire will motivate us to buy and consume meat from the grocery store. But my concern is that whenever we consume the corpses of animals, we express the belief that “animals are consumables,” and this might make ourselves and others more likely to participate in animal exploitation, which causes extensive felt harms.

References

  • Bruckner, D. (2015). Strict vegetarianism is immoral. In B. Bramble & B. Fischer (Eds.), The moral complexities of eating meat (pp. 30–47). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Carolina Tiger Rescue. (2018). Frequently asked questions. Retrieved October 26. https://carolinatigerrescue.org/about/frequently-asked-questions/.

  • Davis, S. (2003). The least harm principle may require that humans consume a diet containing large herbivores, not a vegan diet. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 16(4), 387–394.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeGrazia, D. (2002). Animal rights: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • DeGrazia, D. (2019). Sentience and consciousness as bases for interests and moral status: Considering the evidence and speculating about possibilities. In S. Johnson, A. Fenton, & A. Shriver (Eds.), Neuroethics and nonhuman animals. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demetriou, D., & Fischer, B. (2018). Dignitarian hunting: A rights-based defense. Social Theory and Practice, 44(1), 49–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, S., & Kymlicka, W. (2013). Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, B. (2016). Bugging the strict vegan. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 29, 255–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, B. (2018). Arguments for consuming animal products. In A. Barnhill, M. Budolfson, & T. Doggett (Eds.), The oxford handbook of food ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, C., & Barron, A. (2016). What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. PNAS, 113, 4900–4908.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMahan, J. (2008). Eating animals the nice way. Dædalus, Winter, 1–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers, C. (2012). Why it is morally good to eat (Certain Kinds of) meat: The case for entomophagy. Southwest Philosophy Review, 29(1), 119–126.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milburn, J. (2017). Animal rights and food: Beyond regan, beyond vegan”. In M. Rawlinson & C. Ward (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of food ethics (pp. 284–293). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, S. (2011). Vegetarianism. In R. G. Frey & T. L. Beauchamp (Eds.), The oxford handbook of animal ethics (pp. 877–905). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. Berkeley: University of California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shriver, A. (2009). Knocking out pain in livestock: Can technology succeed where morality has stalled? Neuroethics, 2(3), 115–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation. New York: Avon Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (1979). Killing humans and killing animals. Inquiry, 22, 145–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wild Animal Sanctuary. (2013). Frequently asked questions. Retrieved October 26, 2018, from http://www.wildanimalsanctuary.org/sanctuary/faq.html.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Colorado, 1878 Fourmile Canyon Drive #3, Boulder, CO, 80302, USA

    Cheryl Abbate

Authors
  1. Cheryl Abbate
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cheryl Abbate.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Abbate, C. Save the Meat for Cats: Why It’s Wrong to Eat Roadkill. J Agric Environ Ethics 32, 165–182 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09763-6

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09763-6

Keywords

  • Animal ethics
  • Roadkill
  • Eating animals