Values in Climate Ethics

  • Hein Berdinesen


The aim of the article is to give an outline of a value theory suitable for climate ethics, based on a perfectionist account on the convergence between prudential values and moral responsibility. I claim that such a convergence may generate a system of values that specify norms and obligations and attribute responsibility towards future generations, and thereby provides us with a measure of acceptable political action.


Climate change Climate ethics Value theory Moral perfectionism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EducationWestern Norway University of Applied SciencesStordNorway

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