Abstract
Theory of mind is defined as the understanding that mental states predict and explain people’s behaviors. It develops around the age of 4 but seems to remain deficient in people with ASD, whereas other forms of naïve understanding remain intact. This study compares children with ASD to neurotypical children on tasks measuring naïve psychology, physics, and biology (biological parts). Results suggest that children with ASD only underperform on an implicit false belief task. Performances in naïve biology and physics were equivalent across the two groups and uncorrelated to performance on the false belief task. This confirms that naïve physics and biological reasoning are intact in children with ASD but that tracking false beliefs is challenging for this population.
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Funding
This study was funded by research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Insight grant # 435-2017-0564) and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD; #R01HD068458) awarded to Diane Poulin-Dubois.
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The first and last authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by KB and ED. The first draft of the manuscript was written by KB and the other two other authors revised the first version of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
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Poulin-Dubois, D., Dutemple, E. & Burnside, K. Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD. J Autism Dev Disord 51, 3600–3609 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-020-04813-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-020-04813-9