Abstract
We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.
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Notes
The traded sector includes non-traded goods other than housing.
In our data, all regions have wage levels that pay the top income tax. There is no deduction for the social security tax, but there is a minimum income requirement that does not affect our calculations. The five most Northern labor market regions have lower tax rates and larger deductions, but this is ignored to focus on the effect of the tax system.
The complete expression also includes a term capturing population effects due to regionally differentiated payroll taxes.
Alternatively, the deadweight loss can be calculated as \(\hbox {DWL}=\frac{1}{2}\xi \cdot Var(s_T {\hat{T}}_j )\), where \(\xi \) is the elasticity of the population differential with respect to the tax differential as share of income. Given our parameterization, \(\xi =-11.8\), compared with an elasticity of −6 in Albouy (2009). The size of the DWL is the same as in Eq. (21).
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Acknowledgements
We appreciate research collaboration with Rolf Aaberge and Audun Langørgen at Statistics Norway, access to housing data arranged by Fredrik Carlsen, financing from Norwegian Center for Taxation NoCeT NHH, comments at the 2014 Norwegian Research Forum on Taxation, the 2015 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society, the 2015 LAGV Conference in Public Economics, and the 2015 European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association, and in particular suggestions from David Albouy, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Jorge De la Roca, Erik Fjærli, Bas Jacobs, Agnar Sandmo, Nicholas Sheard, Jens Suedekum, Peter Birch Sørensen, Dave Wildasin and two anonymous referees. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Handling amenities in income taxation: Analysis of tax distortions in a migration equilibrium model.”
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Hedonic regressions behind the regional measures of wages and housing costs
Appendix 2: Parameter values and model calibration
As described in Sect. 3, the model calibration is based on Norwegian data for wages, housing costs, taxes, and population across 89 labor market regions, together with data and stylized facts on model parameters. Values of all parameters are given in Table 8.
To establish the full equilibrium of the model, the remaining variables are calibrated based on the model equations given in Sect. 2. The price index \(({\hat{p}}_j )\) and nominal tax payments \(({\hat{T}}_j )\) follow directly from Eqs. (2) and (17), respectively. We do not have data on land rent \(({\hat{r}}_j )\), so this variable is calculated from Eq. (12) under the assumption that productivity in the housing sector is equal across regions \(({\hat{A}}_{Y,j} =0)\). The exogenous levels of quality of life \(({\hat{Q}}_j )\) and traded sector productivity \(({\hat{A}}_{X,j} )\) follow from Eqs. (4) and (11), respectively. We can then use Eqs. (1) and (3) to solve for per capita consumption of traded goods and housing (\({\hat{x}}_j \) and \({\hat{y}}_j \), respectively). Given our data on regional population size \(({\hat{N}}_j )\) housing production \(({\hat{Y}}_j )\) follows from (16). Factor use in the housing sector \(({\hat{L}}_{Y,j} ,{\hat{K}}_{Y,j} ,{\hat{N}}_{Y,j} )\) is calibrated from Eqs. (8)–(10). Labor demand in the traded sector \(({\hat{N}}_{X,j} )\) follows from Eq. (15), and traded production \(({\hat{X}}_j )\) from Eq. (7). Land and capital use in the traded sector \(({\hat{L}}_{X,j} ,{\hat{K}}_{X,j} )\) are calibrated based on Eqs. (5) and (6). Finally, total supply of land and capital in region \(j({\hat{L}}_j ,{\hat{K}}_j )\) follow from Eqs. (13) and (14).
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Rattsø, J., Stokke, H.E. National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population. Int Tax Public Finance 24, 879–902 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-016-9430-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-016-9430-3
Keywords
- Regional tax distortions
- Payroll taxation
- Cost of living
- Amenities
- Locational efficiency
- Migration equilibrium