Abstract
This paper analyses the optimal tax policy and public provision of private goods when the government is paternalistic and has a redistributive objective. When individuals only differ with respect to their income-earning abilities, the publicly-provided goods should be overprovided, relative to the decentralised optimum, if society’s marginal valuation of them exceeds the individual valuation and if these goods are complements to labour supply. However, when the individuals also differ in terms of their valuation of the publicly-provided good, this simple conclusion does not hold. Optimal marginal income tax rates are shown to differ from the standard rules if publicly-provided goods and labour supply are related.
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Pirttilä, J., Tenhunen, S. Pawns and queens revisited: public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes. Int Tax Public Finance 15, 599–619 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9045-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9045-9