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Irrigation reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

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Irrigation and Drainage Systems

Abstract

This paper is to challenge the widespread perception of irrigation management as a purely technical system based on rational decision-making and implementation. It builds on a case study of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two transitional developing countries in Central Asia. Both countries are characterized by a highly unsustainable water use. An institutional reform of irrigation management is conducted to make it sustainable (through efficiency), market-oriented (through cost-recovery, less state interference), and democratic (through decentralization, user participation). Main tools are the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs) and the introduction of irrigation service fees (ISF). However, the mainly donor-driven reforms did not meet their objectives so far. The research is based on expert interviews and a case study of one WUA in each country. The study builds on a neo-institutionalist approach by analyzing the role institutions (defined as formal as well as informal rules) play in shaping actors perceptions, choices and strategies. The paper argues that obstacles to reform are rooted in two main aspects: (1) The institutional environment in agriculture and in local governance does not provide the necessary incentives and conditions for the reform to become effective. Hence newly established formal rules are not perceived as legitimate and are undermined by informal ones. (2) WUAs as new organizations are – in a process of “institutional bricolage” – incorporated in existing societal and political institutions.

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Notes

  1. See for example the 01/2005 issue of Water Policy.

  2. Organizations are on the one hand actors constrained by institutions. On the other hand, they are institutions themselves, like the internal rule system of hierarchy etc. and the rules they present to other actors.

  3. The term, irrigation service fee’ means that the fee is not for water as a resource as such but for the service of water delivery, i.e. for maintenance and operation of the channels.

  4. During Soviet time, a number of reservoirs was built to use water more effectively for irrigation. Most of these reservoirs have a hydroelectric power plant affiliated. The usage of water resources for hydropower generation increased in significance after independence. Currently, in both countries new dams are built and hydropower gets an important export commodity.

  5. For a detailed assessment of land reform and its consequences in both countries see Sehring (2005, 2006).

  6. The field of activity of the court of elders lies particularly in the range of the traditional and customary law and the solution of smaller conflicts: land disputes, affairs of family, cattle theft and also water disputes. However, its role and range of activity varies considerably in each village. It achieves its goals by means of persuading and social pressure. The members are respected members of the community, held (or hold) often important positions, are however not necessarily old. Nevertheless therein the general authority of the older ones is reflected, which represents a powerful norm in the traditional law. It gained relevance after independence, when the old Soviet system of control eroded. In 1995 it received a (temporary) formal legal basis (Ibraimova 2004; Giovarelli and Akmatova 2002).

  7. The mahalla committee, consisting of local elders and other respected members of the community, is the lowest level of local self-organization. It is an institution that organizes collective religious and social events (like births, weddings and funerals), solves conflicts and provides social services. It defines and perpetuates local values and norms of behavior. The mahalla committee also has the authority to organize hashari, voluntary joint community action. After the Soviet authorities’ attempts to supersede it failed, it was tolerated but never got a formal legal base. Now there are attempts to formalize and transform it into an official state structure for local governance. However, the nature and performance of mahalla committees vary considerably in the different regions and from village to village (Ilolov and Khudoiyev 2001; Grundmann 2004, unpublished).

  8. Village development committees are established by many donors to channel micro-credits and other humanitarian assistance.

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Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the willingness to cooperate and to share experiences and thoughts by my interview partners who took the time to answer my questions and were willing to share their thoughts and experiences with me. Due to the need for confidentiality, I unfortunately cannot thank them by name.

In Kyrgyzstan, I am deeply grateful to Damira Abdyldaevna of the Sokuluk WUA support department and Bakyt Askaraliev of the Agrarian University, Bishkek, and to my two field assistants Nazira Sultanova and Ermek Djumataev. In Tajikistan, I thank Anja Ikbendanz and Donyor Ibodov of GAA Aini office as well as Frank Paepke and Sofia Azizova of GAA Khudjand office and my field assistant Antonina Abdurazakova.

The research for this paper was part of the interdisciplinary project “Water Shortage, Water Use Conflicts, and Water Management in Arid Areas of Central Asia” funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. Finally, I would like to thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) that provided funding for the field research periods. The views expressed are, of course, my own.

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Correspondence to Jenniver Sehring.

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Sehring, J. Irrigation reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Irrig Drainage Syst 21, 277–290 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10795-007-9036-0

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