Abstract
The problem of nonideal theory has been widely discussed in political philosophy in recent times. The problem has received much less attention, however, at the level of individual morality. Since the real world is a nonideal one, the problem is extremely relevant, if moral theory is to guide our action as moral agents. My purpose in this paper is mainly conceptual. I first clarify the distinction between different kinds of nonideal situation (natural accidents or limitations and partial compliance with morality) and how different moral theories face those different kinds of imperfections. Secondly, I try to show that the distinction between the two main sources of imperfection is less straightforward and more complex than might be expected. Finally, I suggest that the role of partial compliance in nonideal moral theory is much more modest and difficult to defend than we might at first think.
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Notes
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 245.
For a definition of nonideal moral theory, see Rawls, op. cit, pp. 7-8. On natural limitations and historical contingencies, see ibid, p. 216. For a detailed analysis of Rawls’ distinction, see A. J. Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory”. Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 5-36, pp. 12 ff.
For a review of the literature on nonideal theory in political philosophy, see Z. Stemplowska and A. Swift, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” in David Estlund (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
The analysis in this paper could be carried out by appealing to moral reasons, instead of moral rules. For my purposes, however, this would not make a substantial difference.
See R. Shafer-Landau, “Moral Rules”, Ethics 107 (1997): 584-611, p. 586-588.
See Immanuel Kant, “On a supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” (1797) in Practical Philosophy, (ed. by Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1785) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 225 ff. I quote Kant here for illustrative purposes only. I am not claiming this is a plausible (let alone the best) interpretation of Kant’s moral theory. Beyond this exegetical point, one might think that your permission (or duty) to lie to the murderer is a special, reactive, one, in the sense defined in the previous section. After all, the situation appears to be similar to one of the legitimate defense of the victim. It is surprising that, after telling the truth to the murderer, you are morally allowed to kill him if it is the only way to prevent his killing the victim. But (according to the standard interpretation of Kant) you are not morally allowed to lie to him. For an argument that lying to the murderer is an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense, see Michael Cholbi, “The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said,” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 79, No. 1 (2009): 17-46. Be that as it may, I will assume that your lying to the murderer is not a reactive, special duty or permission, but the deontic modification of a general duty not to lie.
For a somewhat different, but compatible, classification of moral theories, see DELETED.
You might think that your saying “no” would not be a real lie. The reason would be that Amy would have given her consent to be “lied” to. After all, she does not want to kill her friend Benn. But we can imagine a variation of the example, in which Amy does not want to kill Benn but is indifferent towards Benn’s death and, therefore, does not consent to being lied to.
For the sake of simplicity, I leave aside the possible nonideal situation in which there is both a natural accident and partial compliance.
One can view this argument as an extension to morality of the “principle of fairness” proposed by Hart and Rawls for society as a cooperative enterprise. See H. L. A Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” The Philosophical Review 64, No 2 (1955): 175-191; Rawls, op cit., p. 96 ff.
Acknowledgements
I am especially grateful to Francisco Garcia-Gibson for our joint work on the topic and for his comments on this paper. Thanks also to the participants of the Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas workshop and to an anonymous reviewer.
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Rivera-López, E. What is the Role of Partial Compliance in Moral Theory?. J Value Inquiry (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09914-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09914-5